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AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAWS 
OF CORPORATIONS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
A T the end of the Middle Ages, there stood on the banks of the Thames a walled city comprising about a square mile of ground 
and 100,000 inhabitants, which was known as the City of London. 
During the following centuries, this aggregation of humanity spread 
beyond the walls, engulfing Westminster, Holbrook, Marylebone, 
Hampstead, and twenty-four other boroughs, until it embraced 700 
square miles and 8 million inhabitants. This aggregate was known to 
geographers, travelers, newsmen, and merchants as the City of Lon-
don. But the local residents, with British conservatism, continued to 
call "the City" only that original square mile whose inhabitants had 
now dwindled to less than 5,000. 
In a somewhat similar way, there appeared in the middle of the 
nineteenth century bodies of legislation known as "corporation law." 
During the twentieth century, legislatures found it necessary to enact 
great masses of additional legislation to deal with the special prob-
lems of corporations. People who worked with the entire group of 
relevant laws were known as "corporation lawyers." But, like Lon-
doners, they continued to regard as "corporation laws" only those 
few that covered the same points embraced by the laws of the Vic-
torian era. The others carried distinct sobriquets. 
This usage leads to a confusion in speaking about the "laws of 
corporations," since they are so much broader than "corporation 
laws." It would be hard, though, for a reader to remember that "laws 
of corporations" and "corporation laws" are not the same thing. In 
order to minimize this source of confusion, I shall avoid the term 
"corporation laws," and speak rather of "corporation codes." 
With this understood, several separate bodies of the laws of cor-
porations can be distinguished. These are (1) the corporation codes; 
(2) the judge-made law of corporations; (3) the securities laws; (4) 
the securities transfer laws; (5) the antitrust laws; (6) the tax laws; 
(7) the rules of the stock exchanges; and (8) accounting standards. 
With respect to each of these segments of law, this Article asks what it 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1932, Grinnell College; LL.B. 1936, 
University of Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia University; LL.D. 1971, Grinnell 
College.-Ed. 
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contributes to the corporation regime, how it relates to other seg-
ments of the regime, and how its functions are performed in other 
legal systems. 
II. THE BUSINESS CORPORATION CODES 
A. The Concept of a Corporation Code 
Although every state has many laws dealing with business cor-
porations, it is easy to distinguish the "corporation code" from the 
others. It is the one that takes the corporation from the cradle to the 
grave. It tells how corporations are formed, how their officers are 
elected, how they may issue and retire shares, and how they may dis-
solve and liquidate. It has an air of comprehensiveness, and it 
usually calls itself "General Corporation Law,''1 "The Business Cor-
poration Act,"2 or the "Business Corporation Law,"3 with the def-
inite article indicating that it is the only one on the subject.4 If 
Chief Justice Marshall should awaken--or Chief Justice Burger suf-
fer amnesia-and read one of these laws, he would have every reason 
to think he had found a comprehensive statement of law on corporate 
affairs. 
Codes of similar structure will be found in almost any foreign 
country, from Afghanistan5 to Zambia,6 including socialist states,7 
except that most of them are-more complete than the American codes 
in ways that I will explain later. 
1. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 100 (West 1954); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 868 (1953). 
2. !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.1 (1971). 
3. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1963). 
4. The Model Business Corporation Act is the most typical illustration of all these 
codes, because it has been consciously copied in whole or in part by a majority of those 
now in effect. Its section headings suggest the general structure of such codes. They 
are "Introductory" (short title and definitions); "Substantive Provisions" (purposes, 
powers, name, securities, meetings, directors, dividends, and officers); "Formation" 
(contents and filing of articles); "Amendment" (procedures and reduction of capital); 
"Merger and Consolidation" (procedures and effects); "Sale of Assets" (procedures and 
rights of dissenters); "Dissolution" (conditions permitting or requiring and procedures); 
"Foreign Corporations" (admission, withdrawal, and penalties for unauthorized entry); 
"Annual Reports"; "Fees, Franchise Taxes, and Charges"; "Penalties"; and "Mis-
cellaneous" (state supervision, exceptional procedures, applicability). ABA-ALI MoDEL 
Bus. CORP. Am: (1969). 
5. THE LAw OF COMMERCE §§ 266-466 (translated by the Public Administration 
Service, United States Agency for International Development, Kabul, Afghanistan, 
1967). 
6. LAws OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA vol. 8, c. 216, §§ 1-221, scheds. 1-4 (1965) (in 
English). 
7. E.g., BASIC LAw OF ENTERPRISES (translated by Institute of Comparative Law, 
Collection of Yugoslav Laws, vol. 13, Belgrade, 1966). 
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Along with the most automobiles, television sets, and electric 
toothbrushes, the United States possesses by far the largest number 
of business corporation codes. Every state and the District of Colum-
bia has its own, each a little different from the others. 
This form of affluence seems not to be shared, nor even envied, 
by the other nations of the world.8 It will probably surprise no one 
that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, although it contains 
fifteen "Union Republics" (plus twenty "Autonomous Republics" 
within the Union Republics), and at least twenty recognized national 
languages and cultures, governs corporations or "state enterprises" 
throughout all these republics with the same law.9 More significant, 
perhaps, is the case of India, which contains twenty-four states and 
territories and fourteen major languages. Its founders were familiar 
with the United States legal system, which in some respects they 
emulated, but they chose to have a single national legislation on 
corporations.10 In Mexico, which consists of twenty-nine states, each 
with its mm civil code, there is a single body of federal legislation on 
commercial law, including corporations.11 
As might be expected, the closest parallels to the American posi-
tion are found in other English-speaking nations. In the United 
Kingdom, which contains three differentiated legal systems (England, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland), there are two corporation codes-
one for England and Scotland, the other for Northern Ireland. Al-
though the British Parliament has power to enact legislation for 
Northern Ireland, its members chose in the matter of the Companies 
Act to leave the North Irish Parliament free to choose its own law.12 
In Australia, there are six states that act independently in this area 
S. But see Ziegel, Constitutional Aspects of Canadian Companies, in STUDIES IN 
CANADIAN COMPANY LAW 193 CT• Ziegel ed. 1967), in which the author finds it 
"arguable whether the [Canadian] federal government needs a separate incorporation 
power" and notes that the United States "appears to have managed quite well" 
without it. 
9. See Hazard, The Public Corporation in the U.S.S.R., in THE PUBuc CORl'ORATION: 
A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 374 r,v. Friedmann ed. 1954); A. LINDT, DAS SOWJETRUSSISCHE 
A.KTIENRECHT (1929). 
10. INDIA CoNSTITUTioN sched. 7, list 1, item 43; The Companies Act of 1956, § 1(3), 
[1956) Acts of Parliament (India) 1. See generally B. CHAKRABARTI, INDIAN CoMPANY 
LAW 1-3 (1971); K. VENKOBA RAo, THE INDIAN COMPANIES Acr, 1956 (5th ed. 1966). 
11. The constitution of 1883 made commercial law a subject of federal legislation; 
previously it had been a subject of state legislation. See R. MANTILLA MouNA, DERECHO 
MERCANTIL 15 (10th ed. 1969). 
12. Companies Act of 1948, 11 8e 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 461. 
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of legislation, but they decided in 1959 to make their companies acts 
uniform and in 1962 substantially completed the task.13 South Africa, 
although divided into four provinces, has only one companies act.14 
Most similar to the United States' situation is that of Canada, 
where each of ten provinces has its own companies act. In one sense, 
Canada differs from the United States chiefly in having a smaller 
number of states to legislate. But there is a bigger difference in that 
the federal government has adopted a Canada Corporations Act,15 
under which most large, nationwide companies have chosen to be 
incorporated.16 
2. Why Territorial Multiplicity? 
The historical reasons for the extreme multiplicity of corpora-
tion codes in the United States are not difficult to discover. We 
may start with the United States Constitution, which says nothing 
about whether the states or the federation should hold the power 
of incorporation.17 This silence is easily attributable to the fact 
that incorporation was a very minor business of government in 
1787, when the Constitution was drafted, and remained a minor 
business for many decades thereafter.18 If the Founding Fathers 
thought at all about incorporation, they must have assumed that both 
the states and the federation could continue to grant charters for 
purposes related to their respective powers, as they had done before.19 
Whatever they thought, the effect of their saying nothing was to 
permit the states to continue granting corporate status under the 
doctrine of reserved powers.20 Thus the United States was destined, 
so long as no contrary steps were taken, to have at least as many cor-
poration codes as there were states. 
What is more remarkable is that the federal government did not 
13. H. MAsoN & J. O'HAIR, AUSTRALIAN COMPANY LAw xi (1969). However, minor 
divergences in the acts remained and have been increased by subsequent amendments. 
G, WALLACE & J. YOUNG, AUSTRALIAN COMPANY LAW V (1965). 
14. M. EMMET & T. BARLOW, PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW 1 (6th 
ed. 1969). 
15. CAN, REv. STAT. c. C-32 (1970). 
16. See generally Ziegel, supra note 8. 
17. The exhaustive research by Professor Crosskey into the eighteenth century 
connotations of "commerce" seems to have turned up no specific references to the 
power of incorporation. See w. CROSSKEY, PoLmcs AND THE CoNsrlTUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953), esp. vol. I, at 115-86. 
18. Baldwin, Private Corporations 1701-1901, in Two CENTURIES' GROWTH OF AMERI-
CAN LAw 261, 275 (Yale Bicentennial Pub. 1901). 
19. In 1781, the Continental Congress had created the Bank of North America. 
This and numerous incorporations by the state and federal governments are listed 
in id. at 296-311. 
20. See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 
47 COLUM. L. REv. 547 (1947). 
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take steps to adopt a pervasive national corporation code, which 
would override inconsistent state regulation related to interstate 
commerce, or perhaps "pre-empt" regulation affecting interstate com-
merce in the manner of the National Labor Relations Act.21 Here, 
the explanation does not appear to be constitutional. Although very 
restricted views have been held with regard to what activities con-
stitute "commerce," there is no reason to doubt that the regulation of 
commerce, in the minds of the Founding Fathers, included regulation 
of the incorporation of commercial enterprises.22 If they had looked 
at the principal French commercial legislation extant in their time, 
they would have found that the Ordonnance du Commerce of 1676 
included a chapter on business associations (societes).23 When the 
Napoleonic Code de Commerce was issued in 1807, it, too, contained 
a chapter on business associations, with express reference to stock 
corporations (societes anonymes).24 
But, for a hundred years after the Constitution was written, Con-
gress showed little interest in exercising its commerce power. Mean-
while, throughout the nineteenth century, the states built up their 
idiosyncratic patterns of legislation, their separate bureaucracies for 
dealing with corporation documents, and their addictions to tax 
revenues exacted for corporation privileges. Although federal inter-
vention on the economic scene may be dated generally from 1887 
and 1890 (the dates of the Interstate Commerce25 and the Sherman26 
Acts), federal regulation of corporate organization was miraculously 
postponed until 1933.27 By this time state corporation bureaus were 
firmly established in the statehouse bureaucracies.28 
Some valiant efforts were made to achieve a level of uniformity 
through separate state action. In 1928, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uniform 
21. See, e.g., Amalgamated Assn. of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 
(1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generally 
Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972). 
22. See argument of counsel for Maryland in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 331-33 (1819), where the argument is not that incorporation is generally 
outside the federal power but only that the particular incorporation of the Bank of 
the United States was neither necessary nor appropriate. 
23. Ordonnancc du Commerce, tit. n 7 (des societes), as reproduced in D. JouSSE, 
COMMENTAIRE SUR L'ORDONNANCE DU COMMERCE 1, 9 (1828). 
24. C. CoM. arts. 29-46 (des societes), esp. 29-40 (societes anonymes) (Petit Codes 
Dalloz 1966). These articles were repealed by the Law of July 24, 1966, on Business 
Associations, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III No. 32197. 
25. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-27, 901-1022 (1970). 
26. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). 
27. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). 
28. For further reflections on the neglected federal role in corporation law, sec 
Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and lnvesto1· Protection, 23 
LAW &: CoNTE.\IP. PROB. 193, esp. 194-96 (1958). 
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Business Corporations Act.29 Yet, it never won more than seven adop-
tions80-some of them qualified-and was gradually demoted by the 
Conference from a "uniform act" to a "model act,''31 to an act "rec-
ommended for consideration,"32 and finally to an act "superseded" 
by the Model Business Corporation Act of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law.33 As with 
changes in the Soviet Presidium, these gentle degradations were 
accomplished without a record of debate or a statement of considera-
tions. Even less productive was a brief dalliance by the American Law 
Institute with the idea of a Restatement of the Law of Corporations 
for Profit.34 
Such success as has been achieved in the direction of uniformity 
is attributable to the ABA Model Act.35 But even that Act does not 
aim at complete identity; at many points, it offers "optional" or "al-
ternative" sections, inviting legislatures to go in different direc-
tions.36 Its main thrust is not uniformity of substantive law, but 
standardization of terminology. This is helpful in two ways. First, it 
supplies legislatures with relatively lucid phrases that have been 
honed by experts, and thus reduces the occasions for each provincial 
draftsman to concoct his own distinctive brew of words. Second, it 
increases the probability that a lawyer or judge interpreting a clause 
can find a precise precedent in some other state, if not in his own. 
But it relieves not at all the need for every corporation lawyer to 
have a collection of statutes from fifty states and the opportunity for 
businesses to attain special freedoms by incorporating in one state 
instead of another.87 
29. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
88 (1928). 
30. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
249 (1969). 
31. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
451-52 (1940). 
32. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
277 (1954). · 
33. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HAND· 
BOOK 342 (1958), 
34. Reports in Relation to Future Work of the Institute, in 12 ALI PROCEEDINGS 
367, 414-17 (1935). 
35. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr (1950 and subsequent revisions). The Act was 
prepared by the Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the ABA and 
published by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the ALI. 
36. E.g., ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 26-26A (alternative sections on pre-
emptive rights), § 33 (alternative wording on cumulative voting), § 45(a) (alternative 
forms on declaration of dividends) (1969). 
37. Cf. Jennings, supra note 28, at 196-207. 
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3. The Multiplicity of Special-Purpose Corporation Codes 
So far, I have spoken of territorial multiplicity, arising from the 
enactment of a separate code for each state. There is an additional 
multiplicity, resulting from the enactment of separate corporation 
codes within each state for specially regulated kinds of corporations. 
Michigan, for example, has separate "codes" for the formation and 
operation of banks,38 insurance companies,39 railroad companies,40 
and many other named categories of enterprise.41 All modem states 
have some special provisions for the regulation of enterprises in 
finance and public service. Usually, enterprises of these kinds must 
not start or stop business without permission, and may need permis-
sion to increase or reduce their capital stock, reserved surplus, and 
other funds. 
There are two ways of arranging such regulatory provisions. One 
method, which might be called "supplementary," is to provide a 
separate set of banking or insurance or railroad regulations contain-
ing arrangements for only those special matters on which the industry 
is to be actively supervised. Under the supplementary method, a 
banking corporation would be formed under the general corporation 
code, but would also be required to conform to the orders of the 
superintendent of banking on opening offices, maintenance of capital 
and surplus, and so on. 
The other method, which might be called "substitutionary," is to 
exclude all application of the general business corporation code to 
banks, and to provide in the banking law a complete code of forma-
tion, operation, and dissolution for banks. The same procedure is 
followed for insurance companies, railroad companies, and other 
special subjects of regulation.42 When this method is followed-as it 
is very widely in the United States-there are not one, but several 
corporation codes in the same state with parallel structures but dif-
fering details on the entire cycle of corporate life. 
In foreign industrialized countries, the "supplementary" method 
seems to be the one mainly used. In England, banks and insurance 
companies are formed under the general Companies Act, and the 
Act includes a number of special provisions in order to accommodate 
38, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 487.351-.568 (Supp. 1972). 
39. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 500.5000-.7868 (1967). 
40. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 463.1-467.36 (1967). 
41. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 463.1-464.50 (train railway companies), 
§§ 471.16-.47 (union depot companies), §§ 472.1-.36 (street railway companies) (1967). 
42. E.g., MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.3 (1967) (excluding from general corporation 
act, building and loan associations and companies formed as insurance, railroads, bridges, 
tunnels, and union depots companies). 
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them.43 In France, banks are societes anonymes, as are manufacturing 
companies and department stores, but the banks are subject to addi-
tional regulations and to orders of government ministries.44 
The supplementary method seems to be gaining favor in the 
United States. Although special railroad corporation acts still pre-
vail widely, it is notable that electric generating companies (whose 
operations are now of much greater public necessity) are universally 
formed under general business corporation codes, with supplemen-
tary regulation of their service and finance operations.4ts Moreover, 
there is an incipient movement to revise the special-purpose corpora-
tion codes by repealing their sections on general corporate routines 
and leaving in effect only the regulatory provisions that are peculiar 
to the industry. For example, the 1964 amendments of the New York 
Transportation Corporation Law, which replaced the old provision 
for formation of transportation companies dating from 1890,46 pro-
vide that transportation companies may be formed under the Busi-
ness Corporation Law.47 A similar change has been made for the in-
corporation of banks.48 But insurance corporations remain under the 
old regime.49 
4. The Pains and Pleasures of Multiplicity 
Considering not only the separate state corporation codes, but also 
the special-purpose corporation codes in the various states, there must 
be several hundred corporation codes of various degrees of complete-
ness in the United States. It would probably be impractical to make 
one federal code do the whole job; most European countries have at 
least two general corporation codes ( one for closely held and one for 
publicly held companies), as well as some special-purpose acts. But it 
would be imaginable to have only two or three corporation codes, 
rather than two or three hundred. 
43. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 429-33, sched. 13. 
44. See laws contained in CoDE DE COMMERCE, App., at 605-702 (Petit Codes Dalloz 
1971-1972). 
45. As an example of supplementary regulation, see N.Y. PVll. SERv. LAw (Mc• 
Kinney 1955), as amended, (Supp. 1972) (separate articles on railroads, bus lines, motor 
transports, gas and electric companies, steam and water companies, and telephone and 
telegraph companies). It should be noted that the "systems" of electric generating com-
panies are also subject to a special federal regime involving their acquisition and 
divestitures. Public Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1970). 
46. Ch. 734, [1964] N.Y. Laws, amending N.Y. TRANS. CoRP. I.Aw. See also ch. 735, 
[1964] N.Y. Laws, amending N.Y. R.R. I.Aw. 
47. N.Y. TRANS. CoRP. I.Aw § 4 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also N.Y. R.R. LAW 
§ 6 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
48. Ch. 849, § 74, [1964] N.Y. Laws, repealing ch. 369, §§ 100-03, [1914] N.Y. Laws 
(codified as Banking Laws §§ 90-93). 
49. N.Y. INs. LAw (McKinney 1966), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
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What difference would that make, and to whom? Law publishers 
would be the most directly affected, because they would have less 
books to sell. Lawyers would have fewer statute books to buy and 
fewer statutes to read. On the other hand, the publication of treatises 
might be stimulated because of the larger number of potential 
readers for a commentary on a single code. Law review articles would 
be more widely applicable, and lawyers could more readily find 
authoritative answers to their problems. For the same reasons, sophis-
ticated clients could also find the answers more readily, and might 
become less dependent on their lawyers. Corporations and their of-
ficers could determine more quickly, and probably with less expense 
and more certainty, what rules are applicable to their organization 
and financial structure. State corporation bureaus would probably 
languish; they might be entirely abolished, or reduced to maintaining 
a local index of matters transacted in a national office or in a few 
regional offices. 
If these were the only operative considerations, federal corpora-
tion laws would have been adopted long since. But these considera-
tions are counterbalanced by another. A federal corporation code 
would certainly be much stricter than some, and perhaps stricter than 
all, of those now existing. Corporation officers can readily imagine a 
'federal corporation regime as constraining as the federal securities, 
labor, and antitrust regimes. In contrast, the multiplicity of corpora-
tion laws has produced immense liberality. How this has come about 
is my next subject. 
C. The Liberality of Corporation Laws 
I. The "Race of Laxity" 
In a colorful passage of his dissenting opinion in Liggett Co. v. 
Lee,r•0 Justice Brandeis recounted, "Companies were early formed 
to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was 
lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in advertising 
their wares. The race was one not of diligence but of laxity."51 
While enjoying the sparkle of Justice Brandeis' metaphor, we 
should guard ourselves against imagining that each state's legislature 
is conspiring each year to make its corporation code a little more al-
luringly permissive than any other. A very few states have been 
flaunting more fun at lower prices for traveling enterprises; the rest 
have been grudgingly granting the minimum concessions deemed 
necessary to keep most of their breadwinners at home. The perfor-
50. 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
51. 288 U.S. at 558-59. 
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mance might better be called a "chase" than a "race," since it is 
characterized by one or two starting off in the lead, and the others 
striving only to stay within hailing distance. Most legislatures retain 
a few provisions that are stricter than Delaware's, but most of their 
companies will tolerate these rather than suffer the expense and in-
convenience of a Delaware incorporation. 52 The attitude of con-
temporary corporation law makers was expressed with unusual can-
dor by the Law Reform Commission of New Jersey when it said, 
It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors, employees, 
customers and the general public have come, and must continue to 
come, from Federal legislation and not from state corporation acts. 
. . . Any attempt to provide such regulations in the public interest 
through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would only 
drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.53 
We should guard ourselves also against assuming that all of the 
liberality engendered by the "race of laxity" entails social or eco-
nomic evils. One of the :first relaxations that shocked public opinion 
was the grant of power to corporations to hold shares in other cor-
porations.154 Nearly everyone will concede today that this power 
ought to exist, although they will also insist that there must be some 
limitations, such as those imposed by the Clayton Act65 and by the 
take-over regulations of the securities laws.56 When no-par shares 
were introduced, they appeared to some observers to be works of the 
devil,67 but hardly anyone can now be found who bewails this in-
novation. 68 
Finally, we should not assume that the liberal trend of corpora-
tion codes is some kind of perversion of their original purpose. Cor-
poration codes were introduced in the nineteenth century to permit 
people to organize themselves without the necessity of a special legis-
lative act. Such general authorizations were first given for limited 
purposes, such as the operation of mills, bridges, and turnpikes, and 
were gradually extended to factories, commercial establishments, 
52. See generally Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 
LAW&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 177 (1958). 
53. Corporation Law Reform Commission of New Jersey, Report, in N.J. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14A, at ix, xi (1969). 
54. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 560-61 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
55. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). 
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 
78n(d)-(f) (1970). 
57. Cook, Watered Stock Commissions-Blue Sky Laws-Stock Without Par Value, 
19 MICH. L. REv. 583, 591-94 (1921). 
58. Arguments against no-par stock were not even noticed in 1970 in H. HENN, 
HANDBOOK OF LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 159. 
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and eventually to nearly every kind of enterprise.159 The liberalizing 
phenomenon is often described in a less polemical way by saying that 
corporation codes are "enabling acts," to permit people to organize 
themselves in ways that would not be legally supportable without 
the codes. 60 
2. The Exportation of Liberality 
There is nothing very unusual about a race between states. One 
state's legislators may regulate consumer finance closely, while others 
leave it quite free from constraints, each group believing that its 
method is best "in the long run" for debtors and creditors. What is 
unusual about the race of laxity in corporation codes is that its effect 
will be felt almost entirely outside the state. When Delaware pur-
ported to give Western Airlines liberty to abolish cumulative voting, 
it granted a freedom that predominantly affected the California in-
vestors in Western Airlines and the travelers of California.61 
The strictly-for-export aspect of the Delaware corporation code 
was nicely illustrated by the first section of the General Corporation 
Law as it stood for several decades before the 1967 amendment. 62 
Public utility corporations could be formed under the General Cor-
poration Law if they intended to operate outside the state, but if 
they intended to operate inside, they had to be formed under the 
much more rigorous chapters of Delaware law designed specifically 
for railroad, gas, water, oil, steam, telegraph, telephone, and electric 
power corporations. Whether the race be denominated one of 
liberality or laxity, Delaware has conspiculously won it. Of the 
twenty-five largest industrial corporations in the United States in 
1971, thirteen were incorporated in Delaware.63 Only one of these 
59. Dodd, American Business Assodation Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today, 
in 3 L\w: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 254, 262-73 (1937). 
60. See Katz, supra note 52, at 179. 
61. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 
(1961). 
62. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968). 
63. The 25 largest industrial corporations, as listed by FORTUNE, May 1971, with 
their headquarters and states of incorporation, as listed by MoODY's INVESTOR'S SERv., 
INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS MANUAL (1971) [hereinafter MOODY'S], are as follows: 
Corporation Main Office Incorporation 
General Motors Michigan Delaware 
Standard Oil (N.J.) 
(Exxon) New York New York 
Ford Motor Michigan Delaware 
General Electric New York New York 
International 
Business Machines New York New York 
Mobil Oil New York New York 
Chrysler Michigan Delaware 
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had its headquarters or any substantial fraction of its activities there. 
New Jersey, which had led the chase in the late nineteenth century, 
even lost to Delaware in 1966 one of its historic satrapies-the United 
States Steel Corporation.64 
3. Which Law Governs? 
The provision of legal regimes to be enjoyed in other jurisdictions 
is a uniquely American phenomenon. It should not be confused with 
the "tax haven" game, which is played by Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, the Bahamas, and, even to some extent, Switzerland. These 
countries serve as homes of investment companies or base companies 
that hold shares of operating companies elsewhere.65 But the operat-
ing companies are not incorporated in Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
or the Bahamas. In contrast, General Motors of Delaware is not a 
mere holding company, but an operating company that directly owns 
and operates its factories in Michigan, New York, and California. 
The exportation of liberality within the United States depends 
on a principle of conflict of laws, according to which the law govern-
ing the internal affairs of a corporation is the law of the state of 
incorporation.66 In accordance with this principle, cumulative voting 
in General Motors Corporation is governed by the law of Delaware, 
Texaco 
International Tel. &: Tel. 
Western Electric 
Gulf Oil 
Standard Oil (Cal.) 
U.S. Steel 
Westinghouse Electric 
Standard Oil (Ind.) 
Shell Oil 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
RCA 
Goodyear Tire &: Rubber 
Ling-Temco-Vought 
Procter &: Gamble 
Atlantic Richfield 
Continental Oil 
Boeing 
Union Carbide 
New York 
New York 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
California 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Illinois 
Texas 
Delaware 
New York 
Ohio 
Texas 
Ohio 
New York 
Connecticut 
Washington 
New York 
Delaware 
Delaware 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
Delaware 
Pennsylvania 
Indiana 
Delaware 
Delaware 
Delaware 
Ohio 
Delaware 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
Delaware 
New York 
64. The United States Steel Corporation was formed in New Jersey in 1901 to 
acquire the shares of Carnegie Steel and other companies, mostly based in Pittsburgh 
and the Ohio Valley; presumably New Jersey was chosen because of its leadership in 
permitting acquisition of shares of other companies. In 1965 a corporation of the 
same name was incorporated in Delaware, and in 1966 the New Jersey corporation 
was merged into the Delaware corporation. See Moooy's, supra note 63, at 509-10. 
65. See w. GIBBONS, TAX FACTORS IN BASING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ABROAD (1957): 
Slowinski, Tax Havens-Dead or Alive? in 29 TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 450 (H. Fuller 
ed. 1970). 
66. R.Es'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 296-310 (1971). 
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rather than by the law of Michigan where the company is principally 
operated. 67 
The conflict principle of most European countries is quite dif-
ferent: a corporation is governed by the law of the state in which its 
headquarters are located.68 To illustrate, a company with perpetual 
duration had incorporated in England and later moved its head-
quarters to Brussels, Belgium. According to English conflict rules, 
which are similar to those in the United States, the company con-
tinued to be governed by the law of England, but according to 
Belgian conflict rules, it became subject to Belgian corporation law, 
which causes a corporation to expire thirty years after it was formed, 
unless the charter is renewed. 69 
States in which companies operate could, if they wished, change 
the normal conflict rules and impose their own laws on the Delaware 
corporations that operate principally in the host state. To a limited 
degree, New York has done this by imposing several of her own cor-
poration code rules on foreign corporations that do most of their 
business in New York.70 In an exceptional case, California success-
fully imposed its own cumulative voting requirement on Western 
Airlines-a California-based company with a Delaware charter.71 But 
generally states have not done this-probably fearing that the of-
fended company would blithely move its headquarters to some other 
state if the first host state proved inhospitable. The only states that 
have dared to impose their own rules on resisting foreign corpora-
tions have been New York and California, whose size and situation 
are likely to hold corporations there notwithstanding legal incon-
veniences. It is not surprising that a North Carolina draftsman's 
proposal to impose local standards on "pseudo-foreign" corporations 
was rejected by the legislature. 72 
Theoretically, states could also frustrate the importation of lax 
67. But see Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 
719 (1961). 
68. 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33-46 (2d ed. u. 
Drobnig 1958). 
69. Lamot v. Sodete Lamot Ltd., [1966] 1 Pasicrisie :Beige 336 (Cour de Cassation, 
Delg., Nov. 12, 1965), noted in 94 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 140 (1967); 56 
REvuE CiuTIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Pruvt 506 (1967); 65 REVUE PRATIQUE DES 
Socrtrts CIVILES &: COMMERCIALES 136 (1966). 
70. Rules imposed on certain foreign corporations relate to liabilities of officers 
and directors, disclosure of records, dividends and other distributions, reduction of 
capital, right of withdrawal, derivative suits, and indemnification of officers and direc• 
tors. These provisions apply to foreign corporations that do 50 per cent or more of 
their business in New York and are not listed on a national securities exchange. N.Y. 
Dus. CoRP. I.Aw §§ 1317-20 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
71. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 
(1961). 
72. Jennings, supra note 28, at 206. 
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foreign corporation laws by excluding foreign corporations from do-
ing business in their jurisdiction unless they were governed by laws 
similar to the local ones or consented to be governed by local laws. 
Although natural persons have a constitutional right to migrate from 
state to state for business as well as pleasure, corporations are said to 
lack any such protection.73 However, states have not used their exclu-
sionary power for the purpose of requiring conformity of corporation 
codes. Some legislatures exercise their power of exclusion to the ex-
tent of providing that a corporation is admitted only for the exercise 
of powers that a similar domestic corporation could exercise, but this 
applies to the business they do, rather than to their rules of internal 
organization.74 
4. The Stigmata of Laxity 
a. Comparisons over time. The laxity, or liberality, of state cor-
poration codes in the United States can be detected by various kinds 
of clues. The simplest approach, perhaps, is to identify the points at 
which constrictions existed formerly, but have now been swept away. 
Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent identifying the "race of lax-
ity," cited limits on corporate life to periods such as thirty years, 
limits on total dollar capital, limits on corporate purposes (such 
as transportation, banking, insurance, and manufacturing), and ex-
clusions of stockholding in other corporations as illustrations of 
former constrictions.75 He might well have added restrictions on 
holding real estate beyond that "actually occupied by such corpora-
tion[s] in the exercise of [their] franchise[s]."76 None of these de-
parted restrictions seems to be mourned by contemporary commenta-
tors.77 
More recent relaxations in response to competitive pressures have 
dealt with matters that are still controversial. One of the most de-
bated is the guaranteed option for cumulative voting,78 which has 
recently been eliminated from the Michigan law79 and from the 
73. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing &: 
Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1353 n.77 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afjd., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). 
74. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1306 (McKinney 1963). 
75. 288 U.S. at 560-61. 
76, MICH. CONST, art. XII, § 5 (1908). This provision put a ten-year limit on such 
holdings; it was omitted in the constitution of 1963. 
77. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 82 (rev. ed. 1946). 
78. Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAw. 316 (1960); Steadman &: 
Gibson, Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Mandatory1-A Debate, 11 id. at 
9 (1955); Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 id. at 550 (1961). 
79. Compare Michigan Gen. Corp. Act of 1931, No. 327, § 32, [1931] Mich. Pub, 
Acts 568, with MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 450.1451 (Business Corp. Act Supp. 1972). 
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Illinois constitution.80 Distribution of profits when original capital 
is impaired is now permitted despite the regrets of commentators.81 
Merger laws have been amended to permit deliberate squeeze-outs of 
unwanted minorities. s2 
b. Comparisons between countries. Probably none of these clues 
reveals the full effects of the chase of laxity. The old restrictions, 
which have been eliminated in the interest of equal freedom, are less 
significant than the restrictions that might have been devised to meet 
new conditions if a different legislative atmosphere had prevailed. 
To stimulate one's imagination of what American corporation codes 
might have been in the absence of interstate competition for the 
favor of founders, it is useful to glance at the corporation laws of 
other nations that have nourished gigantic automobile and electrical 
manufacturers, metallurgists, and oil refiners. Examples may be 
found in England, France, Germany, and Sweden. One need only to 
match corresponding provisions on a few key subjects to find striking 
contrasts. 
c. Regulation of stock-watering. An integral part of the corpora-
tion acts of other advanced countries is a provision governing the 
disclosures that must be made to new investors in a company-what 
they must be told, and what liabilities will be incurred for mislead-
ing them. The English Companies Act expressly commands that 
every prospectus-broadly defined as any invitation to invest-must 
contain many specified facts about the company, and particularly 
about any property that the company has recently bought or is about 
to buy for cash or for shares.83 
In France, investor protection takes quite a different form. When 
there is a public offering of securities, independent auditors must be 
appointed to determine the value of any property exchanged for 
shares, and to report on this matter (and on any other special favors 
obtained by the promoters) to a special shareholders' meeting of all 
the new subscribers. If they do not approve, their money, which has 
80. !LI.. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (1870) (omitted from 1971 constitution). 
81. Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon Dividends in 
Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 229, 261 (1935); Hills, Model Corpora-
tion Act, 48 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1334, 1338 (1935); Note, Dividends from Contributed Capital 
and Protection of Preferred Shareholders, 65 id. 1203 (1952). 
82. See ABA-ALI MODEL l3us. CoRP. Acr § 7 (1969) (permitting payment for shares 
of merged corporation wholly in cash or property). Under the prior provision (ABA-
ALI MODEL l3us. CoRP. Acr § 65 (1966)) the consideration had to be securities. l3ut even 
under that type of provision, squeeze-outs were practicable through the exchange of 
nonvoting for voting securities. See Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 
1025 (1952). 
83. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 38 (prospectus must contain 
certain provisions), § 455 (definition of "prospectus'), sched. 4 (items to be included in 
prospectus). 
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been carefully held in escrow in the meantime, is refunded.8-l Most 
of these safeguards are not applicable when there is no public offer-
ing of securities.85 German law also calls for an evaluation of property 
exchanged for shares or bought with share proceeds, either by one 
of the two boards (managing or supervisory), or by independent 
auditors in case of a conflict of interest.86 If the evaluation made by 
the board or the auditors differs from that of the incorporators, the 
Court of Commerce will decide.87 Swedish law is similar.88 
On the whole matter of protecting the investors against over-
valued property, American corporation acts are conspicuously silent. 
The directors decide for what consideration the stock shall be issued, 
and tell the other investors-so far as the corporation acts are con-
cerned-nothing about the decision. 89 "In the absence of actual 
fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors . . . shall be 
conclusive. "90 
The extreme permissiveness of the corporation acts is countered, 
however, by the extreme rigor of state and federal "securities acts."91 
The company must fully disclose the price of any property recently 
acquired or soon to be acquired. 92 The liability of the directors under 
these laws is not limited to actual fraud, but extends to any careless 
failure to avoid misleading partial disclosures.93 In a few states, an 
official may even intervene to forbid the sale if he thinks that a very 
poor bargain is being offered. 94 
84. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 77-83, [1966] J.O. 6402, 
[1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. A good bilingual edition of this law is CCH CoMMON 
MARKET REPORTS, FRENCH LAW OF CoMMERCIAL COMPANIES (1971). 
85. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 84, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] 
J.C.P. III. No. 32197. However, article 80 of the law requires an independent auditor 
even in a private offering. Also, in the event of later contributions in kind, article 193 
requires similar procedures with no private-offering exemption. 
86. Aktiengesetz (.AKTG) §§ 33-34 (1965) (German Stock Corporation Act). A good bi-
lingual edition is CCH COMMON MARKET REPoRTS, GERMAN STOCK COPORATION Acr 
(1967). 
87. AKTG § 35 (1965). 
88. THE SWEDISH STOCK CoRP. Acr OF 1944, §§ 7, 12 (Eng. transl., Aktiebolagct 
Svenska Handelsbanken 1949). 
89. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Supp. 1968), § 153 (Supp. 1971); ABA-ALI 
MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 18-19 (1969). 
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Supp. 1968). See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. 
Acr § 19 (1969). 
91. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) (federal); UNIFOR..'\I 
SECURITIES Acr (adopted in 25 states). 
92. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 7, sched. A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77aa (1970); 
UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r §§ 301, 304. 
93. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 u.s.c. § 77k (1970); UNIFOR.'\i SECURITIES 
Ac:r § 410. 
94. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25141 (West Supp. 1972). See generally L. Loss &: E. 
CoWE'IT, BLUE SKY LAW 35-36, 67-77 (1958). 
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The peculiarity of the American law of security flotations-taken 
in its entirety-is that investor protection is omitted from the "cor-
poration acts" and inserted in a parallel series of "securities acts." 
This arrangement has a number of odd consequences. One is that a 
layman-or even a lawyer who has not been well and recently 
educated-may easily rely on the soothing assurance of the corpora-
tion act ("the absence of actual fraud"), and find that his clients have 
incurred a heavy liability under the securities laws. Another con-
sequence is that there are a number of interstitial situations in which 
investors tend to fall between the protective provisions. Delaware, 
for instance, has no securities act at all, so intrastate transactions 
there are entirely unprotected. A dozen other states have rather pallid 
securities laws that do not require any specified degree of disclosure 
and do not noticeably increase the vague fraud liability of the com-
mon law.95 A third consequence is that a lawyer (or layman) has to 
look into at least three sets of law books to discover the rules of 
liability to investors that impinge upon his incorporating or cor-
porate client. 96 
The peculiarity of the American corporation codes is illuminated 
by a review of the historical development of investor protection pro-
visions in the different countries. We may start with the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century, from which most of the broad self-incor-
poration statutes date. Most legislators of this period seem to have 
entertained no suspicions that promoters would palm off overvalued 
property for shares in new companies. There were no protective 
provisions in the German General Commercial Code of 1861,97 nor 
in the English Companies Act of 1862,98 nor in the New York Busi-
ness Corporation Act of 1875.99 The French were the most sus-
picious. Their share company law of 1867 provided that any proposal 
to issue shares for property must be submitted to an examination 
95. For a survey of state securities acts as they stood in 1958, see L. Loss &: E. 
CoWEIT, supra note 94, at 17-42. An up-to-date compilation of state laws is contained 
in the BLUE SKY L. REP. 
96. That is, the state corporations act, the state securities act, and the federal 
securities act. This is a minimum; if securities are to be sold in more than one state, 
the lawyer must consult the securities acts of all the states in which the securities are 
to be offered. 
97. See, e.g., Entwurf eines allgemeinen Deutschen Hendelsgesetzbuchs, [1861] 
Gesetz-Sammlung fiir die Koniglichen Preussischen Staaten 480 (Prussia). This law is a 
draft based upon the uniform commercial law (AHGB) recommended in 1861 fox 
adoption by the Federation of German States. Most German states, including Austria, 
had adopted it by 1867. In 1871, it was made the law of the Reich. In 1900, it was re-
placed by the HGB, which, as amended, is the current commercial code. I MANUAL OF 
GERMAN LAW§§ 33-34 (2d ed. E. Cohn 1968); 2 id. § 7.1. 
98. An Act for the Incorporation, Regulation, and Winding-Up of Trading Com-
panies and Other Associations, 1862, 25 &: 26 Viet. c. 89. 
99. Ch. 6ll, [1875] N.Y. Gen. Stat. 222; N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. 19, tit. 38 (1875). 
640 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:621 
by an auditor, followed by consideration at a shareholders' meeting 
in which the contributors of property were not allowed to vote.100 
Moreover, each company had to appoint auditors, whose first duty 
was to audit the organization of the company.101 
In all of the countries under consideration, stock-watering proved 
to be a real problem, forcing the legislatures to take action to control 
it. Even in France, which had started out with the tightest controls, 
additions were made. An 1893 provision required that subscribers 
who obtained stock in exchange for property retain their shares for 
two years-presumably to give the company a chance to sue these 
subscribers if fraud should appear.102 Otherwise, the French provi-
sions survived with little change until the shattering experiences of 
the 1930's. At this time, the French share company act was amended 
to require that the auditors who report on the property exchanged 
for shares be free of any entanglements with the shareholders in 
question; brothers, brothers-in-law, employees, and others likely to 
be subject to a conflict of interest were strictly excluded.103 Finally, 
it was required that one of the auditors be the French equivalent of 
a certified public accountant.104 The recodification of company law 
in 1966 preserved these provisions without essential alteration.105 
By 1900, the German states had also made substantial changes in 
their company laws to control stock-watering. The articles of associa-
tion were required to state what property had been exchanged for 
shares and to justify its valuation. If members of the executive or 
supervisory boards were promoters, independent auditors, appointed 
by either the local Chamber of Commerce or the Court of Commerce, 
were required. These amendments were codified in the Commercial 
Code of 1900,106 and survived in the general revisions of the corpora-
tion code in 1937 and 1965.107 
England dealt with the watered-stock problem in two stages. In 
1890, directors were made liable for untruths in prospectuses, unless 
they could carry the burden of proving that they had used due dili-
gence to ascertain and state the true facts.108 But there was no require-
100. Law of July 24, 1867, art. 4, [1867] D.P. IV. 205. 
101. Law of July 24, 1867, arts. 5-6, [1867] D.P. IV. 205. 
102. Law of Aug. 1, 1893, art. 2, [1893] D.P. IV. 68. See generally 1 G. RIPERT, 
TRAITE ELtMENTAlRE DE DRorr COMMERCIAL 517 (5th ed. R. Roblot 1963). 
103. Decree of Aug. 8, 1935, art, 3, [1935] D.P. IV. 1588. 
104. Decree of Aug. 8, 1935, art. 4, [1935] D.P. IV. 1588. See also Decree of Aug. 31, 
1937, art. 2, [1937] D.P. IV. 566. 
105. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 80, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] 
J.C.P. m. No. 32897. 
106. Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) §§ 186, 191-94 (1900). 
107. AktG § 25 (1937); AKTG § 33 (1965). 
108. Act of Aug. 18, 1890, 53 8e 54 Viet. c. 64, § 3(1). 
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ment that a prospectus be issued, nor one prescribing its contents if 
issued. The general revision of the company law in 1908 remedied 
these deficiencies by defining any invitation to buy shares as a pro-
spectus, and then requiring that every prospectus should tell about 
any property to be exchanged for shares.100 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant difference from the French and German pattern was the absence 
of any explicit requirement of independent auditors for valuation of 
property contributions. The English pattern of 1908 has survived the 
general revisions of 1929110 and 1948.111 
During the same quarter century when European countries were 
beefing up their statutes to fight watered stock, the same abuses were 
rampant in the United States. Their footprints are preserved in the 
cases where courts struggled to provide remedies through the famed 
"trust fund," "fraud," and "statutory duty" theories.112 But the 
American legislators, unlike those of other nations, remained almost 
immobile. If they intervened at all, it was to nullify the judges' ef-
forts by decreeing that the judgment of the board of directors should 
be conclusive in the absence of fraud-without even excluding self-
interested directors from this indulgence.113 It is small wonder that a 
future Supreme Court Justice found ample material for a scathing 
book on Other People's Money.114 Whether or not promoters flour-
ished more in the United States than in the old country has never 
been comparatively analyzed; it is certain that no other rich nation 
persisted so long in supplying promoters with a complaisant legisla-
tive ambiance. 
When state legislatures-led by Kansas in 1911115-screwed up 
their nerve to require substantial disclosures and to impose penalties 
for careless misrepresentation, they acted not by stiffening the body 
of their corporation acts, but by inventing a new kind of legislation 
called securities acts.116 The reasons for these choices were obvious 
enough. It would not have helped much to stiffen the Kansas cor-
poration code so long as the codes of Arkansas, Delaware, and New 
Jersey remained unchanged; it was not practical, even if it were con-
stitutionally possible, to regulate the organization of foreign corpora-
tions that might sell their securities to Kansas residents. 
The same pattern was followed when the federal government 
109. Act of Dec. 21, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, §§ 80-82, 285. 
110. Companies Act of 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 34-37, 380. 
Ill. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 37-43, 455. 
112. See notes 187-89 infra and accompanying text. 
113. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text. 
ll4. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). 
115. Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 133, [1911] Kan. Laws 210. 
116. Sec generally L. Loss&: E. CowEIT, supra note 94, at 3-10. 
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took up securities legislation in 1933. It had no direct power to alter 
the corporation codes of the various states; all it could do was erect 
a parallel and independent system of regulation. 
By reason of these peculiarities of the federal system, the United 
States has come to have corporation acts that are uniquely permissive 
toward stock-watering, and an independent set of securities acts that 
are uniquely rigorous. The statement in the corporation acts-that 
the board of directors' valuation of property is conclusive in the 
absence of actual fraud-is belied by the securities acts, which make 
the directors liable for saying less than enough, or for saying some-
thing untrue if by due diligence they could have learned of its 
falsity. 
d. Conflict-of-interest provisions. The bashfulness of American 
legislators in the presence of promoters is almost equalled by their 
reticence in regard to corporation managers. In other advanced coun-
tries, the corporation acts deal explicitly and firmly with the possibil-
ity that corporation managers may have conflicts of interest in 
corporate transactions. They deal with this danger in two ways-one 
transactional, one structural. The transactional approach is to pro-
vide that the transactions in which the managers' personal and 
official interests conflict are voidable, or that the company may adopt 
the transaction for its own benefit. The structural approach is to 
provide for some superboard, or parallel board, that keeps watch on 
the managers and reports to the shareholders. 
(1) Transactional restrictions. The transactional approach is 
pursued most vigorously in France.117 Under the law of 1966, conflicts 
between the personal and the official interests of an administrator 
must be reported to the whole board of administrators, which in turn 
informs the auditors and the shareholders; the latter may disapprove 
and hold the administrator responsible for any loss incurred.118 With 
respect to the ordinary fees or salaries of administrators, authoriza-
tion can be given only by the shareholders.119 
The English law is curiously divided. The statute itself provides 
only that directors must disclose their conflicts of interest.120 But a 
standard bylaw-one of those automatically adopted unless expressly 
117. See Warren&: Willard, A Comparative View of the New French Approach to 
Corporate Conflicts of Interest: The Law of July 24, 1966, 24 Bus. LA.w. 809 (1969). 
118. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 103-04, [1966] J.O. 6402, 
[1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
119. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 107-09, [1966) J.O. 6402, 
[1966) J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
120. Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, §§ 16(1)(c)-(d); Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 
12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 199. 
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rejected-excludes the director from voting on most matters in which 
he has a conflicting interest.121 
The German law contains the most sweeping provisions on con-
tracts between board members and the corporation; these provisions 
depend for their efficacy on the distinctive German separation be-
tween an executive board and a supervisory council.122 Transactions 
between board members and the board are completely unauthorized 
-no matter how much disclosure and abstention from voting may 
have been performed; transactions with board members can be made 
only by the supervisory council.123 On the other hand, German law 
does not expressly condemn contracts between companies with inter-
locking directorates; in this area, it seems to rely on structural restric-
tions, designed to minimize the incidence of such conflicts.124 
Sweden simply forbids directors to act or vote on matters in which 
they are personally interested or in which they are involved through 
a "material interest" in another interested corporation.125 
In contrast, the principal American statutes do not breathe a 
word against directors acting under conflicts of interest. Where they 
speak at all, it is to approve actions in conflict situations that might 
otherwise fall afoul of some judge's puritanical prejudices. Thus 
the Model Act takes pains to declare that the board of directors 
may fix directors' compensation, if the articles of incorporation have 
not forbidden it to do so,126 and to provide that a contract tinged 
with conflict will nevertheless be valid if the affected directors dis-
close their interests and abstain from voting, or if shareholders ratify 
it after receiving an adequate disclosure, or if the arrangement is 
essentially fair. 127 Even these provisions primly refrain from pro-
nouncing any sanctions against conflicts, unless such sanctions can 
be negatively implied from their rejection under the stated circum-
stances. 
In this area, the silence of the statutes is to some extent compen-
sated by the vaunted rigor of the common-law fiduciary concept,128 
which may have more drastic effects than the chiseled precepts of the 
121. Companies Act of 1948, II &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 28, sched. 1, table A, § 84. 
122. See generally Steefel &: von Falkenhausen, The New German Stock Corpora-
tion Law, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 518 (1967); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: 
Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1966). 
123. AKTG § 112 (1965). 
124. AKTG § 88(1) (1965). See text accompanying notes 126-29 infra. 
125. THE SWEDISH STOCK CORPORATION Am: OF 1944, § 86 (Eng. transl., Aktiebolaget 
Svenska Handelsbanken 1949). 
126. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Am: § 25 (1969). 
127. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Am: § 41 (1969). Accord, CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 
(West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
128. H. B.\LLANTINE, supra note 77, §§ 66-72a; H. HENN, supra note 58, §§ 235-41. 
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Old World statutes.129 Although most writers agree that the common-
law doctrine is rigorous, they do not agree at all about where it 
starts and stops.130 In any state without a large collection of de-
cisions, a judge has a wide area of choice; federal judges have a 
wide area in which to guess what a state judge would decide if he 
had the chance.131 Lawyers are assured of the opportunity to file 
voluminous briefs, with ample authority for any advantageous stance. 
Securities legislation has had very little impact on conflict-of-
interest transactions. The state blue sky laws and federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933132 seem completely inapplicable. The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934133 touches the problem lightly. When share-
holders' votes are sought on conflict-tainted transactions, proxy state-
ments must reveal conflicts of interest.134 Under recent decisions, the 
shareholders' vote could probably be annulled if the necessary dis-
closure was omitted or made falsely.185 But the law says nothing 
about when shareholders must be consulted. If company charters 
are drawn to permit conflict-tainted transactions without consulting 
shareholders, the tangential impact of the Exchange Act can be side-
stepped. 
(2) Structural restrictions. In the European corporation codes 
the structural devices for making conflicts of interest unlikely, and 
for ensuring that they will be discovered and evaluated if they exist, 
are fully as important as the devices for annulling the transactions 
themselves. 
Here, the most remarkable device is the German division of man-
agerial authority between an executive board and a supervisory 
council.186 The council members are elected by the shareholders and 
the employees. They appoint the board members, but the council 
members cannot manage the company, nor put themselves into ex-
ecutive positions.187 The executive board members wield the powers 
of management, but subject to the council that has chosen them.188 
129. Steefel &: von Faulkenhausen, supra note 122, at 531 (German law). But see 
Warren&: Willard, supra note 117, who find no lack of rigor in French law on this 
subject. 
130. See sources cited in note 128 supra. 
131. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1947). 
132. 15 U.S.C, §§ 77a-77aa (1970). 
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-l (1970). 
134. Schedule 14A, item 4, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1972). 
135. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
136. See Vagts, supra note 122, at 50-53. 
137. A1nG §§ 101, 119(1) (election), § 84 (appointment of executives), § 111(4) 
(managerial functions),§ 105 (incompatibility with executive board membership) (1965). 
138. AKTG § 76(1), lll(I) (1965). 
March 1978] The Laws of Corporations 645 
Moreover, the executives must not be executives or partners in any 
other enterprise without the council's very specific consent.139 So 
their chances of having conflicting interests are cut down at the very 
beginning. 
In France, the new law permits an arrangement similar to the 
German, with an executive board and a supervisory council.140 But 
the predominant regime today-as for the past century-is char-
acterized by an administrative board, checked by a board of audi-
tors.141 Although the auditors (unlike the German supervisory coun-
cil) do not have any power over the administrators, they are at least 
coordinate; they are elected by the same body, the shareholders,142 
and are charged not only with verifying financial statements, but 
with reporting any irregularities of management that they discover. 
It is these auditors who receive reports of conflicts of interest, and 
are bound to prepare a report to the shareholders and to the state 
prosecutor.143 
The English structural safeguards against conflicts of interest 
are notably feebler than those of France and Germany, but are 
still substantial enough to merit contrast with the gaps in Ameri-
can laws. All publicly held companies are required to have auditors, 
who are chosen from an officially certified list (and thus comparable 
to American certified public accountants),144 elected by the share-
holders,145 and obliged to report to the shareholders.146 Their re-
port is confined to the accuracy of the financial statements;147 they 
are not invited to report on other irregularities (as are French audi-
tors), nor are they empowered to appoint and remove executives 
(as is the German supervisory council). 
Structural safeguards against conflicts of interest are completely 
absent from American corporation acts and are only sparingly sup-
plied by other legislation, except in specialized situations.148 En-
139. AKTG § 88 (1965). 
140. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. II8-52, [1966] J.O. 6402, 
[1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
141. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 89-117, 218-35, [1966] J.O. 
6402, [1966] J.C.P. IIL No. 32197. 
142. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 223(1), [1966] J.O. 6402, 
[1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
143. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 103, 233, [1966] J.O. 6402, 
(1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
144. Companies Act of 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 161. 
145. Companies Act of 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 159. 
1'16. Companies Act of 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 162. 
147. Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 14, formerly Companies Act of 1948, II & 12 
Geo. 6, c. 38, sched. 9. 
148. R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 443-44 (3d ed. 
abr. 1959). 
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tangling alliances of directors are inhibited by laws relating to banks, 
railroads, and registered public utility holding companies,149 but 
there are no comparable statutes for most other types of commercial 
and industrial companies. The antitrust rule against interlocking 
directorates among competitors150 is hardly relevant; it is com-
panies that deal with each other, rather than companies that com-
pete with each other, that present conflict-of-interest problems. 
e. Auditing. One of the sharpest contrasts between corporation 
codes of the United States and other developed countries relates 
to the requirement of independent auditors. England, France, and 
Germany categorically require them.151 They are appointed by the 
shareholders152 and must be certified public accountants (or the 
European equivalent).153 They cannot serve if they are too closely 
tied to the management by business or family connections.15i 
The principal corporation acts of the United States are politely 
silent on this delicate subject. This glaring gap is partly patched 
by stock exchange regulations, which apply to listed companies,15r; 
and partly by Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, 
which also apply to "registered" companies (unlisted companies with 
over 1 million dollars in assets and 500 or more shareholders).m 
149. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970) (interlocks between investment banks and commercial 
banks that are members of federal reserve system); 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970) (interlocks 
between banks that are members of federal reserve system); 15 U.S.C. § ?9q(d) (1970) 
(interlocks between commercial banks or investment banks and registered public utility 
holding companies). There is also a provision of a more limited type in the Trust 
Indenture Act that forbids an indenture trustee (normally a bank and trust company) 
from having an interlocking director with the debtor company. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) 
(1970). 
150. Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). 
151. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 159-62; Law of July 24, 1966, 
on Business Associations, arts. 218·35, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32897; 
AKTG §§ 162-69 (1965). See also THE SWEDISH STOCK CORPORATION Am: §§ 105·13 (Eng. 
transl., Aktiebolaget Svenska Handelsbanken 1949). 
152. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 159; Law of July 24, 1966, on 
Business Associations, art. 223, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197; AKTG 
§ 163(1). 
153. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 161(1); Law of July 24, 1966, 
on Business Associations, art. 219, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197; AKTG 
§ 164(1). 
154. Companies Act of 1948, 11 8e 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 161(2) (excluding officers and em• 
ployees and their partners); Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 220, 
[1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197 (excluding incorporators, officers, board 
members, employees of the company or its affiliates, and the close relatives by blood 
or marriage of these persons); AKTG § 164 (1965) (excluding members of the executive 
and supervisory boards and employees). 
155. See NEW YORK STOCK Ex.CHANGE, !Ne., COMPANY MANUAL § A4, at A-67 (cur-
rent ed. of updated looseleaf) [hereinafter NYSE COMPANY MANUAL]. Other exchanges 
do not publish their rules to the same extent as the New York Exchange, but arc 
believed to make similar requirements in practice. See also pt. VIII infra. 
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (defining companies required to register); § 78m (requiring 
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These patches miss more than they cover: they cover about 7,000 
listed and registered companies; they miss about 1.5 million unlisted 
and unregistered companies, of which at least 100,000 are million-
dollar companies.151 
On the other side of the Atlantic, there are also some exemptions 
from the auditing rules, but they are much more carefully confined. 
While England no longer has any exemption,158 before 1967 exempt 
private companies were excused from hiring a certified public ac-
countant, although they still had to have an independent audit.1159 
In France, small close corporations are exempt;160 the principal 
substantive tests for this status are capital not exceeding approxi-
mately 60,000 dollars, shareholders not exceeding fifty, and restric-
tions that prevent share transfers to new members without consent 
of a supermajority of the existing members.161 
At this ·writing, the German law is perhaps even more permissive 
than the American on permitting companies to escape the audit 
requirement. Although all negotiable share companies are subject 
to this requirement-regardless of size-it can be escaped by taking 
the limited liability company form, which in Germany has no 
formal limit on amount of assets or number of shareholders.162 
But German law is destined to change very shortly. A law reform 
proposed by the government will subject companies to the auditing 
requirement when they have assets worth more than approximately 
I million dollars, whether or not they are listed or traded, and 
whether or not they issue negotiable shares.163 What is more im-
portant is that the reform, if adopted, will create a strong incentive 
for smaller companies to have their accounts audited; managers will 
be personally liable for losses resulting from accounting errors if 
they fail to hire public accountants to audit the statements.164 
reports) (1970); SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1972) (requiring certification by 
certified public accountants). 
157. These estimates are based on the analysis of distribution of corporations by 
size in Eisenberg, The Legal Role of Shareholders and Management in Modem Corpo-
rate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. R.Ev. I, 33-34 (1969). 
158. Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 2. 
159. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 161(1). 
160. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 64, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] 
J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
161. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, arts. 36, 45, [1966] J.O. 6402, 
[1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197; Decree of March 23, 1967, art. 43, [1967] J.O. 2843, [1967] 
J.C.P. III. No. 32897. An English translation of this decree is contained in CCH 
COMMON MArutEr REPORTS, FRENCH LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES (1971). 
162. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (GMBHG) (Law 
on Companies with Limited Liability), April 20, 1892, [1892] RGBl. 477. 
163. Fleddermann, Der Referentenentwurf Eines GmbHG, 1969 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 
97, 100, dting § 141 of the Referentenentwurf. 
164. Fleddremann, supra note 163, citing §§ 138, 147 of the Referentenentwurf. 
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Another great difference between the European and American 
systems flows from the fact that the European auditors are officers of 
the corporation, elected by the shareholders, and bear legal responsi-
bility to assert their views in opposition to the management. In 
France, as already mentioned, 165 the auditors are bound to reveal 
any irregularities that come to their attention to the shareholders 
and (if the irregularities are serious enough) to the state prosecutor. 
In Germany, if the auditors disagree with the management on how 
the accounts should be presented, they must take the matter to 
court for decision.166 In England, their report must be read at the 
shareholders' meeting.167 
The position of American auditors is very different. If the 
original auditors refuse to certify the accounts, the management 
is free to seek other auditors who are more agreeable. The original 
auditors have no duty to complain to the shareholders. 
f. Summation on laxity. One could cite additional subjects on 
which United States corporation codes are silent but foreign codes 
speak out. They would serve only to reinforce the pattern already 
observed. 
The differences between the standards of management conduct in 
the United States and in Europe are not great when all sources of 
legislation and business custom are included, but there is a striking 
difference in the codification of these standards. In Europe, most of 
them are expressly stated at a logical point in the corporation code. 
In the United States, most are dealt with in securities legislation, or 
by regulations of the securities exchanges, or through customs im-
posed by the financial markets. Where the locus of the rule is federal 
securities regulation, the substantive requirement may be more 
rigorous than in Europe; the enforcement is almost certain to be. 
But the United States system leaves vastly more and wider gaps 
through which corporations escape the impingement of rules that 
enlightened modern opinion considers appropriate. Moreover, the 
United States system is more occult, and permits a high probability 
that corporation lawyers will proceed in blissful ignorance of some 
of the standards incumbent upon their clients. 
Ill. THE JUDGE-MADE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
The law of corporations would be a sad rag if it were limited 
to the emissions of the legislatures. Despite the superficial inclu-
165. See text accompanying note 143 supra. 
166. AKTG § 169 (1965). 
167. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 162(2). 
March 1973] The Laws of Corporations 649 
siveness of the cradle-to-grave corporation codes, they have left most 
of the hard questions to be answered by the judges. Confronted with 
cases that had to be decided, the judges have resorted to freehand 
sketching, with results varying from the sublime to the ridiculous. 
A. The Shareholder's Complaint 
Some time after incorporation was made easy, it became evident 
that some wielders of corporate power would brandish their weapons 
incompetently or dishonestly, and that the built-in controls, such as 
corporate expiration and annual elections, would be inadequate to 
correct the resulting evils. The laws of most other industrialized 
countries require some additional built-in controls-especially the 
independent board of auditors168-but they have not stopped there. 
More than a hundred years ago, French legislation provided for a 
derivative action to be brought on behalf of the company by holders 
of five per cent of the shares,169 and recent legislation extends the 
right to a single shareholder.170 German and Swedish legislation 
permit an action on demand of ten per cent.171 English legislation 
permits a single shareholder to sue for an order "regulating the con-
duct of the company's affairs in the future."172 
In the United States, no legislature has expressed such distrust 
of corporation managers, and the minority shareholder has depended 
for his protection almost exclusively on judicial invention. Even 
before the Civil War, judges had shown themselves quite ready to 
respond to shareholders' complaints. Although New York contributed 
the most celebrated cases, similar decisions were rendered in Missis-
sippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.173 In 1855, the United 
States Supreme Court extended the concept from suits against mal-
feasant corporate officials to suits against governmental officials who 
168. See text accompanying notes 136-50 supra. 
169. Law of July 24, 1867, art. 17, [1867] D.P. IV. 205. 
170. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 245, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] 
J.C.P. III. No. 32197; Decree of March 23, 1967, [1967] J.O. 2843, [1967] J.C.P. III. No. 
32897. See also l G. RIPERT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 697-98 (6th ed. 
R. Roblot 1968). 
171 • .AKTG § 147(1) (1965) (§ 123(2) of the 1937 AktG was similar); THE SWEDISH 
STOCK CoRPORATION Acr of 1944 §§ 128-29 (Eng. transl., Aktiebolaget Svenska Handels-
banken 1949). 
172. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210. This provision was an 
innovation of the 1948 Act. 
173. E.g., Bayless v. Orne, 1 Free. Ch. 161 (Miss. Ch. 1840); Robinson v. Smith, 3 
Paige 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); Langolf 
v. Soiberlitch, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 64 (Pa. C.P. 1851); Putnam v. Sweet, 1 Chand. 286 
(Wis. 1849). For these cases and their historical evaluation, I am indebted to Prunty, 
TIie Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 
(1957). 
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were making illegal claims against the corporation.174 Incidentally, 
the Court affirmed the propriety of federal courts' entertaining de-
rivative suits under their diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction.175 
In the 1940's, legislatures of a half-dozen states were persuaded 
by business interests to put brakes on derivative suits by requiring 
plaintiffs to deposit security to pay the defendants' legal fees if the 
plaintiffs should lose the suit.176 Probably the proponents thought 
they had, as Hornstein lamented, rung the "death knell of derivative 
suits."177 But the judges found ways around these provisions. Most 
statutes had an escape hatch for large shareholders,178 and New York 
judges permitted shareholders to aggregate their claims to reach the 
escape level; they even adjourned the suits to give plaintiffs time to 
assemble the required number of shares.179 
In the late 1950's, Congress set up an additional impediment to 
derivative suits by providing that a corporation should be deemed a 
resident of its principal place of business, as well as of the state in 
which it was incorporated.180 This provision considerably reduced 
the opportunities to establish "diversity of citizenship," and thereby 
cut down derivative cases in federal courts.181 
Despite legislative hostility and the absence of any express legis-
lative encouragement, the derivative suit survives. According to 
latest reports, it is on the upswing.182 This should not be taken as 
a symptom of shareholder discontent, or of legal privateering. In a 
174. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). 
175. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 346-47. 
176. The lead-off statute was New York's, now N.Y. Bus. CoRP. I.Aw § 627 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972), which was based on F. Woon, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCK• 
HOLDERS' DERIVATIVE Surrs (1944). The report was commissioned by and prepared for 
the New York Chamber of Commerce. 
Other statutes requiring shareholder plaintiffs to post security exist in Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Among important states without them are 
Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio. See generally H. HENN, supra note 58, § 372. 
177. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 
CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944). 
178. See sources cited in H. HENN, supra note 58, § 372, at 782 n.3. In New York, 
the requirement did not apply to holders of shares amounting to five per cent of the 
class or worth 50,000 dollars. See N.Y. Bus. CoJU>. LAw § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
179. Baker v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950). See 
also Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
180. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c) (1970)). 
181. See Kessler, Corporations and the New Federal Diversity Statute: A Denial of 
Justice, 1960 WASH. U. L.Q. 239. 
182. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74 (1967). 
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decade when shareholders are doubling,183 should the quantum of 
shareholders' suits remain static? 
B. The Errant Enterprise: The Theory of Ultra Vires 
Early corporation codes (and the officials who administered them) 
required articles of incorporation to be very specific about the busi• 
ness that the corporation proposed to follow. If the corporation was 
a railroad, the termini must be named without equivocation. But 
circumstances often made some change in the business plan impera-
tive or desirable, and the practical businessmen who ran the corpora-
tion usually trimmed their sales to the wind. As long as all went well, 
no one was likely to complain. But when things went badly, some-
one was sure to remember that the corporation had strayed from its 
sworn objective. 
Legislatures had usually been quite positive about the essentiality 
of the incorporators' declaring their purpose, but almost never said 
anything about what would happen if the enterprise strayed from 
it. When judges were presented with this tangled skein, many found 
an easy way out by pretending that whatever was done ·wrong was 
not done at all; it was "ultra vires."184 Often the ridiculous conse-
quence was to reward the transgressor by relieving it of paying for 
value received. This bit of judicial futility is still endured in En-
gland.185 In the United States, it was first mitigated by conflicting 
opinions of a more practical if less logical bent; but today, virtually 
183. The New York Stock Exchange reports the following total number of indi• 
vidual shareholders: 
}'ear 
1952 
1956 
1959 
1962 
1965 
1970 
Number in Millions 
6.49 
8.63 
12.49 
17.01 
20.12 
80.85 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, !NC., SHAREOWNERSHIP--1970, CENSUS OF SHAREHOLDERS 1 
(undated). 
184. E.g., Ashbury R. Carriage &: Iron Co. v. Riche, L.R. 7 H.L. 653 (1875) (hold-
ing company not liable on promise to pay for a railroad built to its order); Central 
Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 (1891) (sleeping-car company not 
liable to pay another for equipment and business purchased and received). See gen-
erally w. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 50-62 (4th ed. unabr. 1969). 
185. BOARD OF TRADE, COMPANY LAW COM!'.mTEE, REPORT, CMND. No. 1749, 1111 
35-42 (1962) Genkins Report); L. GowER, THE PRINCIPLES oF MODERN COMPANY LAw 
83-101 (3d ed. 1969); R. PENNINGTON, PRINCIPLES OF CoMPANY LAW 86-99 (2d ed. 1967). 
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all legislatures have provided more sensible solutions, and relieved 
the judges of groping in the dark.186 
C. Watered Stock 
Another glaring gap in the early corporation codes was the treat-
ment of promoters and shareholders who participated in erecting 
corporations with stated capital far in excess of the real assets of the 
corporation-the problem of watered stock. With their accustomed 
negligence, legislatures had indicated clearly enough that stock 
should have a stated value, but omitted to provide for the unfore-
seen circumstance that the statement might not be true. When 
American judges were confronted with promoters' abuses and found 
themselves unarmed with any statutory weapons, they improvised a 
number of legal theories that still bedevil students in ivied halls. 
The United States Supreme Court in 1873 manipulated a "trust fund 
theory"-invented for quite different purposes-to impose liability 
on shareholders.187 Other courts, rejecting this farfetched rationale, 
embraced an equally farfetched conception of fraud to impose li-
ability on a smaller group of shareholders.188 The New Jersey court 
supersensorily perceived, through the legislative silence, a legislative 
purpose to make innocent sharesubscribers liable to guilty credi-
tors.1s9 
One can hardly fail to admire the idealism, and to share the moral 
indignation, that inspired these judicial efforts. At the same time, 
one must recognize that these exertions had very little tendency to 
punish the guilty parties-the promoters-and a very strong ten-
dency to catch bargain-hunting investors, who were just as in-
nocently victimized as the creditors whose claims they were called 
on to satisfy. These judicial doctrines provided nothing like the 
prophylactic requirement of disclosure that inhered in the English 
prospectus requirement, or the focusing of liability on the promoters 
that characterized the German and French attacks. 
Although the anti-watered stock doctrines are not quite dead, 
their objectives are now served more effectively in other ways. Their 
formal objective of compelling subscribers to pay full par value for 
186. See 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 277-78 (2d ed. 1971), W. CARY, supra note 
184, at 67-69. 
187. Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610. 
188. E.g., Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. &: Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 
(1892). 
189. Easton Natl. Bank v. American Brick &: Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732, 64 A. 917 
(Ct. ElT. &: App. 1906). 
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their shares is now achieved by statutory provisions.190 Their eco-
nomic objective of repressing the fraudulent overvaluation of assets 
is accomplished by the securities laws-both state and federal-which 
permit administrative officials to enjoin fraudulent promotions be-
fore they start, and to punish their perpetrators after they have taken 
place.191 
D. Fiduciary Duty and Conflicts of Interest 
'While some gaps have now been closed, other essential chapters in 
the canons of corporate conduct are still missing from the legis-
lative script. A conspicuous instance is the fiduciary duty of directors, 
of which not a word is said in the influential Delaware and Model 
corporation codes. These documents specify liability only for specific 
oversights, such as paying dividends without a surplus.192 A few 
legislatures in recent years have been brave enough to announce 
that a director of a corporation of that state ought to act in good 
faith and with the diligence, care, and skill of an ordinarily prudent 
man under similar circumstances. Pennsylvania seems to be alone 
in declaring openly that he should be deemed to stand in a fiduciary 
relationship,193 although more than forty states have been willing 
to impose this rigorous standard upon a partner.194 They seem to 
prefer maintaining an embarrassed silence about whose interests 
the directors should serve. The judges, on the other hand, have 
rather unanimously proclaimed directors' duties to act in the in-
terests of their organizations, including the duty to bring into the 
common pot the profitable opportunities that emanate from the 
common endeavor.105 
Closely allied to fiduciary duties are the effects of conflicts of 
interest on the part of officers and directors. In other advanced 
countries, the legislators have attacked this problem directly by pro-
190. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (Supp. 1968); ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. 
Acr § 25 (1969). 
191. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 17, 20, 24, 15 u.s.c. §§ 77q, 77t, 77x (IQ70); UNIFORM 
SECURITIES Acr §§ 101, 408-09. 
192. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (Supp. 1968) (payment of dividends, repurchase 
of stock, or redemption of stock without proper funds); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus, CoRP: 
Acr § 48 (1969) (unlawful dividends, unlawful repurchase of shares, or unlawful dis-
tribution on liquidation). Prior to 1969, the Model Act also punished giving loans to 
directors and commencing business without paid-in capital, but these punishments were 
eliminated, presumably in pursuit of liberality equal to Delaware's. ABA-ALI MODEL 
Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 43(d)-(e) (1966). 
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Pardon Supp. 1972). 
194. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 21. For an adoption list, see 6 UNIFORM LA.ws 
ANN. 5 (West Supp. 1972). 
195. See, e.g., H. HENN, supra note 58, §§ 236-38. 
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viding that managers cannot negotiate agreements between them-
selves and their company. Such provisions are found not only in the 
continental countries, with their tradition of codification, but also 
in England, the mother of the common law.196 
In the United States, however, legislatures have left these thistles 
for judges to harvest. In general, the judges accepted the challenge, 
and imposed rigorous standards. In their early encounters, they 
tended to treat directors like family trustees, whose mere presence 
on opposite sides of a bargain rendered it voidable by either party.197 
In more recent decades, they softened their doctrine to a presump-
tion of invalidity, or to a requirement that such contracts merely be 
"fair. "198 
When the legislatures belatedly stepped into the picture, it was 
usually to restrain the zeal of the judges. The Delaware law, for 
instance, nowhere declares transactions void or voidable by reason 
of conflict of interest, but says they shall not be invalid if they meet 
any of a number of tests involving disclosure, a majority of disin-
terested votes, and shareholder ratification.199 The Model Act is 
similar.200 Judge-made law remains the motive force for invalidating 
transactions infected with conflict of interest. Moreover, judges have 
had to fight to save their conflict-of-interest principle from complete 
emasculation through shareholder ratifications. When shareholders 
ratified pure giveaways, the judges unsheathed the ancient saber of 
ultra vires and declared the ratification invalid.201 
E. Insider Trading 
Of all unpleasant subjects that might repel an undecided incor-
porator, the one most superstitiously shunned by legislators is that of 
dealings between corporate officials and the shareholders of their 
corporations. From early days to late ones, the cases tell of corporate 
officials who have astutely bought up the shares of the company with 
knowledge of good news that had not yet been imparted to the other 
196. See text accompanying notes 117-50 supra. 
197. E.g., Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.R., 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886). See gen-
erally H. HENN, supra note 58, § 238. 
198. E.g., Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). The story of the 
transition has been well told by Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest 
and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966). 
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1968). 
200. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 41 (1969). 
· 201. E.g., Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 
1952); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904, 120 A.L.R. 227 (Sup. Ct. 
1938). 
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shareholders.202 Professor Manne argues, rather persuasively, that 
the opportunity to do this is one of the main attractions of becoming 
a corporation official.203 
Judicial indicators have fluctuated between extremes. In the 
earliest cases courts tended to think that such trading was permissi-
ble, or at least an ungovernable aspect of free securities markets.204 
Shortly after the tum of the century, the courts of a few agricultural 
states swung to the view that insiders should tell everything before 
buying; doctrinally they declared that directors were trustees for the 
shareholders.205 But in all the major financial strongholds--Massa-
chusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois--the "no duty" rule 
persisted. 200 
A more tenable middle ground was sketched by the United States 
Supreme Court, with its famous "special facts doctrine": An insider 
does not need to tell all, but if the good news is extraordinary, he 
may not use devious means to withhold the facts or to conceal his 
identity as buyer.207 This became "federal general common law," 
applicable to all suits in federal courts. 
In 1947, a classic instance of corporate officials' overreaching 
was presented to a federal court in Pennsylvania.208 The officers 
and half-mvners of a company operating in Michigan bought out 
the absentee mvners of the other half, who lived in Pennsylvania, 
without telling them of a profitable opportunity to sell the whole 
company.200 At any time before 1938, the Pennsylvania owners would 
have had a plausible chance to win under the "special facts" doc-
trine. But in that year, the Supreme Court discovered that federal 
general common law, which it had been applying for at least a cen-
tury, did not exist.210 So the suit, filed in a federal court in Pennsyl-
vania, seemed destined for an inglorious end. 
202. Early monuments to managers' initiative in this realm include Board of 
Commrs. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 23 A. 426 
(Ct. Err. 8: App. 1891); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). 
203. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 131-45 (1966). 
204. See cases cited in note 202 supra. 
205. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Dawson v. National Life Ins. 
Co. of America, 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 
77 P. 277 (1904); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916). 
206. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Fischer v. Guaranty 
Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1940), afjd. mem., 285 N.Y. 679, 34 
N.E.2d 379 (1941); Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 319 Pa. 430, 179 A. 565 (1935); 
Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905). 
207. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
208. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
209. 73 F. Supp. at 800-01. 
210. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938): "There is no federal general 
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The district court, however, made a discovery that startled not 
only the defendants, but also the corporate bar. In the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 lay a seldom-cited section authorizing the SEC to 
regulate short sales, stop-loss orders, and any other "manipulative or 
deceptive device."211 Under the authority of this section, the Com-
mission had issued an even less noticed rule that in effect declared 
any incompleteness of disclosure in connection with a securities pur-
chase or sale to be a "deceptive device."212 The failure of the 
Michigan shareholders to tell the Pennsylvania shareholders all they 
knew was therefore unlawful. Finally, the unlawful conduct gave 
rise to a civil action on behalf of the persons injured-the Pennsyl-
vania shareholders.213 
Although cloaked as a bit of statutory interpretation, this decision 
was hardly less a judicial creation than the "special facts doctrine," 
whose empty chair it filled.214 How little it was foreseen by Congress 
is confirmed by the absence of any guides on judicial procedure such 
as those Congress had provided to accompany other remedial sections 
of the same act.215 The courts were obliged to create a whole system 
of remedies and procedures. State requirements of security for ex-
penses were found not applicable,216 but state statutes of limitation 
common law." See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Com-
mon Law, 19 R.Ec<>RD OF N.Y.C. B.A. 64 (1964), 39 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 384 (1964). In 
support of the contrasting view-that federal general common law was not just a fly-
ing saucer-see 1 W. CRossKEY, supra note 17, at 626, 633; 2 id. at 865-937; Clark, 
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 
55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941). 
211. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
212. Now rule IOb-5 under Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1972). 
213. 73 F. Supp. at 800. 
214. For the shocked surprise of a professor, see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 
l0b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 627 (1963). In the 
year before this decision, Ganson Purcell, who had resigned in the same year from the 
chairmanship of the Commission, and two members of the SEC legal staff wrote at 
length concerning SEC enforcement of the accountability of corporation officers. On 
the last four pages of their fifty-odd page article, they wrote briefly of the impact of 
rule IOb-5, and predicted increased use of the Commission's "administrative machinery" 
to investigate and seek injunctive relief. There was not a word about a private share-
holder's remedy. Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforcing the Accountability of Corporate 
Management and Related Activities of the S.E.C., 32 VA. L. R.Ev. 497, 551-54 (1946). 
215. In section 9, which expressly forbade specific forms of market-rigging and au-
thorized the Commission to regulate dealing in options, Congress expressly authorized 
private suits in state or federal courts, allowed court orders requiring security for ex-
penses, and imposed a one-year time limitation. Likewise, section 16(b) authorized 
private suits on stated conditions in state or federal courts with a two-year time limita-
tion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p(b) (1970). 
216. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 
(1961). 
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were.217 Derivative and class actions were admissible.218 Counsel fees 
could be awarded by the court.219 Relief was granted in the form of 
rescission, damages, and accounting for profits.220 In the notorious 
Texas Gulf Sulphur cases,221 where the SEC was the complainant, 
the defendants were required to deposit their profits in court for 
distribution to claimants who might appear.222 Taken together, these 
rulings constitute one of the major waves of recent judicial lawmak-
ing in the civil and commercial area. Their effect was to restore to 
the federal courts power over insider trading, with or without diver-
sity of citizenship.223 What is more remarkable is that in this area 
American courts were not grappling with problems that had already 
been attacked or conquered by European legislators, but with ones 
that European legislators had not yet faced. Only in the late 1960's 
and I 970's, after the American law of insider trading had unfolded, 
did European legislators and commentators begin to give their atten-
tion to this problem.224 
IV. THE SECURITIES LAWS 
A. An American First? 
Of all the features of laws of corporation in the United States, 
those that usually awaken the greatest curiosity in foreign observers 
are the "securities laws." This in turn leads to speculation about why 
the United States has had such an unusual development in this area. 
Are United States enterprisers more unscrupulous than those of 
other nations, calling forth a unique governmental effort at repres-
217. Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967). 
218. Norte 8c Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 
(1970) (derivative suit); Weisman v. M.C.A., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258 (D. Del. 1968) (class 
action). 
219. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 950 (1970). 
220. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5, § 9.1 (current ed. 
of updated looseleaf). 
221. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), revd. in 
part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), decided 
on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afjd. in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1005, decided on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
222. 312 F. Supp. at 90-94, afjd. on this point, 446 F.2d at 1307-08. 
223. Cf. G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RlsE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
407-09 (1970); Friendly, supra note 210, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C. B.A. at 86, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. at 413-14; Note, Federal Corporation Law and I0b-5: The Case for Codification, 
45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 274 (1970). 
224. See Hcmard, Terre 8c Mabilat, Les reformes apportees a la loi sur les societes 
commerciales en decembre 1970, in 1971 REcUEIL DALLOZ-SIREY (chronique) 139, 140-
42; Schwark, Insider-Geschiifte auf dem Wertpapiermarkt, 1971 DER BErRIEB 1605. 
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sion? Or did the wide dispersion of wealth-enabling very unsophis-
ticated people to buy securities--create the need for an unusual de-
gree of regulation? Or did the dramatic quality of the 1929 market 
crash trigger this extraordinary effiorescence of administrative power? 
The answers are much more complex than the questions, and 
require a separation of various aspects of the securities laws, some 
of which are rather distinctive and others of which are belated fol-
lowers of reforms adopted much earlier in other countries. 
B. Informing New Investors 
The aspect of securities legislation that has the heaviest impact on 
corporate organization is the requirement that new investors be 
offered information about what they are invited to buy. This is the 
heart of the Securities Act of 1933225-the first of the federal acts-
and a principal focus of most state "blue sky" laws.226 
There was nothing new about this kind of regulation when Con-
gress adopted it in 1933. The Act of 1933 was preceded by forty-seven 
state blue sky laws,227 starting with the Kansas Act of 1911.228 Prob-
ably a majority of these contained registration provisions.229 
Nor was it a new idea when Kansas adopted it in 1911.230 As early 
as 1867, the British Companies Act required that prospectuses should 
disclose contracts made or to be made bet1veen the company and the 
promoters.231 This direction was backed up in 1890 by the Direc-
tors' Liability Act,232 whose language was to be virtually copied forty-
three years later in section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.233 The 
225. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j (1970). 
226. L. Loss & E. CoWETr, supra note 94, at 30-39. 
227. Id. at 17. 
228. Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 133, [1911] Kan. Laws 210. 
229. L. Loss & E. CoWETr, supra note 94, at 34, report that 37 of the securities a ... ts 
extant in 1958 contained provisions for registration of securities. Other securities acts 
generally contained provisions requiring the registration of dealers and provisions en-
hancing civil and criminal penalties for fraud. 
230. The principal novelty in the Kansas act was the wide discretion given the 
Commissioner to determine which offerings were sound and which were fraudulent. 
Id. at 8-9. 
231. 30 & 31 Viet. c. 131, § 38. This and other acts from 1862 to 1900 are con-
veniently collected in A. GLYNNE-JoNES, THE CoMPANIFS Acrs 1862 TO 1900 (3d ed. 
1902). 
232. 53 & 54 Viet. c. 64. 
233. Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), with Directors' 
Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Viet. c. 64, § 3(1): 
3. (l) Where after the passing of this Act a prospectus or notice invites per• 
sons to subscribe for shares in or debentures or debenture stock of a company, 
every person who is a director of the company at the time of the issue of the 
prospectus or notice, and every person who having authorised such naming of 
him is named in the prospectus or notice as a director of the company or as hav-
March 1973] The Laws of Corporations 659 
Directors' Liability Act imposed personal liability on directors for 
false statements unless they proved that they reasonably believed the 
false statements, having relied on the reports of experts or on other 
plausible bases. In 1900 the British prospectus requirements were 
fleshed out with a whole list of questions specifically to be answered 
by the prospectus, 234 and these requirements were further elaborated 
in 1908.235 Likewise, before the turn of the century, the French and 
German statutes contained provisions to assure that share subscribers 
were informed about the promoters' dealings, and France required 
appointment of a special auditing committee to review the company's 
organization. 236 
The most distinctive aspect of the securities offering laws in the 
United States was not their originality, but their lateness in arriving. 
Another distinction was their separation from the corporation codes 
ing agreed to become a director of the company either immediately or after an 
interval of time, and every promoter of the company, and every person who has 
authorised the issue of the prospectus or notice, shall be liable to pay compensa-
tion to all persons who shall subscribe for any shares, debentures, or debenture 
stock on the faith of such trospectus or notice for the loss or damage they may 
have sustained by reason o any untrue statement in the prospectus or notice, or 
in any report or memorandum appearing on the face thereof, or by reference 
incorporated therein or issued therewith, unless it is proved-
(A) With respect to every such untrue statement not purporting to be made 
on the authority of an expert, or of a public official document or state-
ment, that he had reasonable ground to believe, and did up to the time of 
the allotment of the shares, debentures, or debenture stock, as the case may 
be, believe, that the statement was true; and 
(B) With respect to every such untrue statement purporting to be a statement 
by or contained in what purports to be a copy of or extract from a report 
or valuation of an engineer, valuer, accountant, or other expert, that it 
fairly represented the statement made by such engineer, valuer, accountant, 
or other expert, or was a correct and fair copy of or extract from the report 
or valuation. Provided always that notwithstanding that such untrue state-
ment fairly represented the statement made by such engineer, valuer, ac-
countant, or other expert, or was a correct and fair copy of an extract from 
the report or valuation, such director, person named, promoter, or other 
person who authorised the issue of the prospectus or notice as aforesaid, 
shall be liable to pay compensation as aforesaid if it be proved that he had 
no reasonable ground to believe that the person making the statement, 
report, or valuation was competent to make it; and 
(C) With respect to every such untrue statement purporting to be a statement 
made by an official person or contained in wliat purports to be a copy or 
extract from a public official document, that it was a correct and fair repre-
sentation of such statement or copy of or extract from such document, 
or unless it is proved that having consented to become a director of the company 
he withdrew his consent before the issue of the prospectus or notice and that the 
prospectus or notice was issued without his authority or consent, or that the pros-
pectus or notice was issued without his knowledge or consent, and that on be-
coming aware of its issue he forthwith gave reasonable public notice that it was 
so issued without his knowledge or consent, or that after the issue of such pros-
pectus or notice and before allotment thereunder, he, on becoming aware of any 
untrue statement therein, withdrew his consent thereto, and caused reasonable 
public notice of such withdrawal and of the reason therefor, to be given. 
2!14. The Companies Act of 1900, 6!1 &: 64 Viet. c. 48, § 10. 
2!15. The Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 81. In the same 
Act, section 84 incorporated the director's liability provisions of 1890. 
236. See laws cited in notes 100-01 &: 106 supra. 
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into which the corresponding provisions of European laws were in-
serted. Both features are attributable, in part, to the lack of a federal 
corporation code, which could have effectively governed the offerings 
of all corporations. Yet, there is an additional reason why American 
securities laws were so late in coming and so separated from the cor-
poration codes. Regulation of prospectuses in the state corporation 
codes would have been futile, because it would have had no effect on 
corporations of the other forty-seven states. Worse, it would probably 
have driven some domestic enterprises to incorporate elsewhere. To 
regulate securities effectively, legislators had to invent a new pattern 
of commands that would apply to in-state operations of out-of-state 
corporations. 
When the legislation came, it descended with pent-up force that 
far surpassed that of its European predecessors. The state blue sky 
laws frequently empowered the state commissioner not only to re-
quire information, but to forbid the issuance of securities that ap-
peared to be unsound.237 The federal law was fortified with a 
powerful commission authorized to investigate, issue stop orders, and 
promulgate rules that substantially sharpened the corners of the 
original enactment. 23s 
C. Publication of Financial Results 
A second concern of securities regulation is the publication of 
financial results. Most state corporation codes require no spontaneous 
report of the company's financial status or of its periodic achieve-
ments.239 State securities laws are equally silent on financial report-
ing after securities have once been sold to the public. In the few 
237. See L. Loss & E. CoWETT, supra note 94, at 35-37. 
238. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 7-8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g-77h, 77j (1970). 
239. Under the ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr (1969), a corporation must let a 
qualified shareholder inspect its books at the company offices and must supply financial 
statements on written request (section 52). The annual report filed with the state re-
veals only gross assets and stated capital, without liabilities (sections 125(g)•(h}); even 
the asset statement is unnecessary if the corporation elects to pay a franchise tax on its 
entire capital (section 125(h))-the normal procedure for an intrastate company. Dela-
ware law is even less demanding. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 220-21, 224, 502 (Supp. 
1971). 
Exceptional are the requirements of Massachusetts for a public filing of assets and 
liabilities (MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 156, § 47 (1970)) and of Michigan for public filing 
of a balance sheet and income statement {MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 450.1901 (Business 
Corp. Act Supp. 1972)). Probably unique is the Michigan requirement of spontaneously 
circulating financial statements to shareholders. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1901 
(Business Corp. Act Supp. 1972), formerly Michigan Gen. Corp. Act of 1931, No. 327, 
§ 45, [1931] Mich. Pub. Acts 584. 
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states that do require annual financial statements, the content of the 
statements is so unspecified that the statements are of little value.240 
It was therefore a considerable innovation in American legislation 
when the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required that statements 
of financial condition and of income and expense be filed for public 
use in conformity with accounting rules established by the Commis-
sion.241 It was not so much of an innovation in American practice, 
because the 1934 requirement applied only to companies with securi-
ties listed on stock exchanges, and these companies were already in 
the habit of publishing financial statements, partly in response to 
exchange requirements and partly out of a desire to maintain market 
favor for their securities.242 The impact of the requirement was in-
creased when extended in 1964 to all other companies with more 
than a million dollars in assets and 500 or more shareholders,243 but 
most of these companies had also been publishing statements in the 
financial press prior to this amendment to the 1934 Act.244 
In some respects, these requirements were long preceded by the 
legal norms of other advanced nations. English law required publica-
tion of balance sheets by all except private companies from 1908 on, 
and from 1929 on required that income and expense statements be 
distributed to shareholders.245 Germany required presentation to the 
shareholders' meeting of a balance sheet as early as 1870, and of a 
profit-and-loss statement from 1900 on.240 The French law of 1867 
required presentation of a balance sheet and profit-and-loss state-
ment.247 
As in other matters, the federal securities legislation made up for 
lost time by the rigor of its provisions. It required that the statements 
be deposited for public inspection (whereas foreign laws generally 
240. See note 239 supra. The statement to be circulated under the 1931 Michigan 
act was "a true statement of the operations and properties of such corporation," with-
out further articulation. Michigan Gen. Corp. Act of 1931, No. 327, § 45, [1931] Mich. 
Pub. Acts 584. 
241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)-(b) (1970). 
242. See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1931). 
243. Act of Aug. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 566, as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1970). 
244. See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1960). 
245. Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 26(3); Companies 
Act of 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 123(2), 130(1). See L. GOWER, supra note 185, at 
454. See also note 257 infra. 
246. ADHGB § 225a, added by Law of June II, 1870, [1870] BGBl. 375 (Jahres-
rechnungen und Bilanzen); HGB §§ 260, 263 (1900). 
247. Law of July 24, 1867, art. 34, [1867] D.P. IV. 205 (requiring l'inventaire, le 
bilan et le compte des profits et des pertes). 
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required only submission to auditors and shareholders) and enabled 
the Commission to issue detailed rules (as it promptly did) on the 
content and detail of these statements.248 The rules, contained in 
regulation S-X,249 far exceed the strictness of any comparable foreign 
decree. 
D. Proxy Regulation 
In 1834, it seemed to Chief Justice Hornblower of New Jersey 
that when the legislature gave votes to shareholders, it meant for 
votes to be cast personally, as in a political election.250 But legislators 
in New Jersey, and in other states as well, eliminated any doubt on 
this matter and provided universally for representation at corporate 
meetings by proxy, with very little limitation on who the proxy 
holder might be.251 
Their generosity in permitting shareholders to vote by proxy was 
not accompanied by any assurance that the shareholders would be 
informed about the affairs to be voted on. When fundamental 
changes were to be voted on, shareholders had to be given copies or 
summaries of the proposal, and in case of special meetings had to be 
notified of the subjects to be discussed.252 But there was generally no 
requirement calling for the distribution of financial information or 
any other information that would facilitate an intelligent decision, 
either on the subjects of the meeting or about the solicitor of the 
proxy. Courts did little or nothing to fill in the silences of the legis-
lators. 
This was the situation that made possible the "management con-
trol" of which Berle and Means ·wrote in 1932-three years after the 
stock market debacle and one year before the Roosevelt New Deal.253 
It is hardly surprising that proxy regulation became one of the major 
impacts of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.254 Basically, the Act 
authorized the SEC to force each proxy solicitor to disclose to share-
holders whatever they ought to know. The Commission promptly 
248. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). 
249. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .12-41 (1972). 
250. Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 27 Am. Dec. 33 (Sup. Ct. 1834). 
251. E.g., Act Concerning Corporations § 38, [1877] N.J. Rev. Stat. 184; Gen-
eral Corp. Law of 1892, ch. 687, § 21, [1892] 2 N.Y. Laws 1808. 
252. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(a) (Supp. 1968) (special meeting), 
§ 242(c)(l) (Supp. 1971) (amendment of articles of incorporation); ABA-ALI MODEL 
Bus. CoRP. Acr § 29 (special meeting), § 59(b) (amendment of articles of incorporation), 
§ 73 (merger) (1969). 
253. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-90 
(1st ed. 1932). 
254. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). 
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ordered managements to circulate essential facts about the financial 
affairs of the corporation and about the identity and qualifications 
of the candidates for directors. Additional information was required 
when fundamental changes were proposed, and all requirements were 
fleshed out with detailed schedules.255 
The United States system of proxy regulation was not a close 
copy of anything that had formerly existed elsewhere, although some 
of its elements had antecedents in English law and practice. Before 
1900, Chancery had rules that the notice of meetings laconically 
required by the Companies Act must disclose essential information, 
such as conflicting interests of directors.256 In 1929, England intro-
duced the requirement of sending an income statement to the share-
holders without waiting for individual requests.257 But a distin-
guished comparativist writing in 1957 still treated as unique the 
United States requirements for informing shareholders of the sub-
jects of meetings.258 
E. Insider Trading 
A fourth impact of securities legislation is in the area of trading 
by insiders on inside information. This phase of regulation is in-
tended to restrain the temptation that managers have to buy shares 
when notified of good news before the public, and to sell them when 
forewarned of bad news. Congress explicitly called for a forfeiture 
of all short-term gains by insiders;259 the courts added a forfeiture of 
all gains (short or long term) when the use of inside information 
could be proved.260 
Of all the phases of securities regulation, this is the most distinc-
tively American. Not until the past decade have European countries 
made a few tentative steps to develop comparable restrictions.261 
255. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-l to -103 
(1972). 
256. Kaye v. Croydon Tramways Co., [1898] I Ch. 358; Tiessen v. Henderson, 
[1899] I Ch. 861. See Baillie v. Oriental Tel. &: Elec. Co., [1915] l Ch. 503 (1914). In 
these cases, the court deduced the disclosure requirement from the statutory specifica-
tion of notice; the court considered that the notice should be sufficiently detailed to 
enable the shareholder to determine whether he ought to go to the meeting and seek 
further information, or whether he could safely let the management do as it wished. 
257. L. GoWER, supra note 185, at 454. This reflects a broad interpretation of Com-
panies Act of 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 123, 130. The requirement is more explicit 
in Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 156(1), 158(1). 
258. 3 F. DE SOLA CANIZARFS, TRATADO DE SOCIEDADES POR AccIONES EN EL DERECHO 
COMPARADO 178 (1957). 
259. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). 
260. See text accompanying notes 208-23 supra. 
261. See authorities cited in note 224 supra. 
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F. The Multiplicity of Securities Laws 
Like corporation codes, securities laws exhibit a high degree of 
multiplicity, although in a lesser degree. In addition to the federal 
securities acts, every state but one has its own.262 
Luckily, the burden of multiplicity is alleviated in a number of 
ways. The forty-nine states that have securities acts have only one 
apiece, in contrast to their two or three corporation codes and the 
federal government's six securities acts, and a substantial similarity 
among some of the various state acts has been promoted by the Uni-
form Securities Act.263 The state acts generally deal with only one of 
the four aspects of securities regulation mentioned above-that is, 
with the registration of new securities offerings264-and leave the 
federal law to speak ·with one voice on periodic reporting, proxies, 
and insider trading. A considerable number make the registration 
procedure very simple in cases where registration has also been effec-
tuated under the federal Securities Act.265 Even so, counsel charged 
with legalizing a nationwide securities offering must file papers in 
fifty different offices, check the requirements of fifty different laws, 
and hazard the administrative delays of fifty different bureaus.266 
G. The Obscurity of Securities Laws 
A striking characteristic of the securities laws is their obscurity, 
which takes various forms. One is the occultation of the laws them-
selves; another is the hiding of their meaning, even after one has 
discovered the recondite texts; and a third is the SEC's practice of re-
leasing hints that the laws and rules may proscribe much more than 
they appear to do. 
The initial occultation results from the corporation codes, which 
purport to state the alpha and omega of corporate organization, with-
out so much as a cross-reference to securities laws that deal with the 
same transactions. For example, the Model Business Corporation Act 
soothingly assures the reader that shares may be issued for the con-
262. See 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2209 (1969). The exception is Delaware. 
263. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws claim 27 adoptions of the Uni-
form Securities Act, but annotations reveal detailed variations from the original. 7 
UNIFORM LAws ANN. 691-787 (West 1970). 
264. They deal with many other matters which I do not consider a part of "corpora-
tion law." Among these are remedies for fraud and licensing of securities brokers and 
dealers. See generally L. Loss&: E. CowETI, supra note 94, at 17-21. 
265. See UNIFORM SECURITIES Am: § 302 (registration by notification), § 303 (registra-
tion by coordination). These sections refer respectively to seasoned securities and to 
securities registered with the federal commission. 
266. See generally Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 1519 
(1969). 
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sideration fixed by the board of directors,267 but fails to note that if 
the shares are offered to more than a selected few, they must be 
registered with up to fifty state and federal securities commissions. 
The Model Act purports to state the requirements of a notice of 
shareholders' meetings, requiring a disclosure of the place, day, and 
hour of the meeting and its purposes,268 but says nothing about the 
financial statements, the compensation of officers, and the details 
regarding candidates that are required to be circulated by the federal 
securities acts. Moreover, the Act states that each corporation shall 
keep accurate books,269 but says nothing about the financial state-
ments that must be publicly filed and made available under the 
federal securities laws. One can hardly find a better example than the 
state corporation laws of omitting "to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading .... "270 
The misleading is quite real. When a small company decides to 
"go public" and consult a securities specialist, it quite frequently dis-
covers that it had been violating securities laws for some time and is 
obliged to make rescission offers to prior stock purchasers.211 
When the lawyer has been alerted to the existence of securities 
laws that gainsay the assurances of the corporation codes, his troubles 
have only begun. Even a very careful and suspicious lawyer could 
read the Securities Act of 1933 without inferring that a client who 
had bought controlling shares on the open market could not sell them 
again in the same way without following certain formalities. He 
would naturally conclude, even after a minute perusal of the defini-
tions, that his client is "other than an issuer, undenvriter or dealer"272 
and thus not restricted by the prohibitions of section 5.273 But he 
would be wrong, as Louis Wolfson discovered by spending a term in 
a federal penitentiary.274 
267. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 18 (1969). 
268. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 29 (1969). 
269. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 52 (1969). 
270. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12(2), 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(2), 77q{a)(2) (1970); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1972). See 
UNIFORM SECtJRITI.ES Acr § 101. 
271. See generally Victor &: Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 
VA. L. REv. 869 (1959). 
272. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1) (exempted transactions), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1970). 
Although section 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(Il) (1970), warns that a controlling person may 
be deemed to be an issuer, on its face this definition is only for the purpose of de-
termining who is an "underwriter." 
273. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). 
274. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
946 (1969). 
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In order to grasp the full extent of the securities laws' sweep, the 
lawyer would have to consult the regulations of the Commission, 
which are phrased in this kind of lucidity: 
Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in 
the conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant 
to the terms of the corporate charter or other governing instruments, 
is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into an-
other equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt from the 
operation of Section 16(b) of the Act: Provided, however, That 
this rule shall not apply to the extent that there shall have been 
either (1) a purchase of any equity security of the class convertible 
(including any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege) 
and a sale of any equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, 
or (2) a sale of any equity security of the class convertible and any 
purchase of any equity security issuable upon conversion, (otherwise 
than in a transaction involved in such conversion or in a transaction 
exempted by any other rule under Section 16(b)) within a period of 
less than six months which includes the date of conversion.275 
The problem of SEC obscurity reached such notoriety that the 
American Law Institute undertook in 1969 to draft a new codifica-
tion of federal securities laws.276 The task is a Sisyphean one because 
the norms that the Commission has developed are no less tortuous 
than the language in which it has encased them. Consequently, it 
seems almost impossible to simplify the form without first simplifying 
the substance, but the latter lies in the prerogative of Congress and 
the Commission. 
SEC obscurity also stems from the Commission's predilection for 
expanding statutory proscriptions by menacing releases, while avoid-
ing the clarification that would be supplied by a formulated rule. A 
conspicuous example of this activity occurred in connection with 
secondary distributions of securities that had been originally issued 
in private sales. For more than thirty years the Commission followed 
a policy of issuing imprecise press releases, disciplining brokers, and 
even launching criminal prosecutions, before attempting to define 
for its justiciables what they may or may not do.277 
275. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rule 16b-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9(a) (1972). 
276. ALI, ANN. REP. 14 (1969). 
277. Rule 144 was the SEC's attempt to deal with the problem, and it became 
effective April 15, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 596. On the private offering before rule 144, see 
Cohan, Should Direct Placements Be Registered?, 43 N.C. L. REv. 298 (1965); Meer, 
The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act-A Study in Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503 (1966); Steffan, The Private 
Placement Exemption: What To Do About a Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of 
Trade, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 211 (1963). For an analysis of rule 144 and its impact, see 
Miller &: Seltzer, The SEC's New Rule 144, 27 Bus. LAw. 1047 (1972). 
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The Commission's problem of obscurity is not easy of solution. 
Many securities laws experts are inclined (as are experts in other 
fields) to accept the intricacies of their craft as inseparable from its 
excellencies.278 The delightful simplicity of state corporation codes, 
they say, is due to the fact that the codes are also intolerably permis-
sive. It remains to be seen whether securities regulations can be made 
limpid without being made limp. 
I£ the American regime of securities regulations is insufferably 
hypertechnical and burdensome, there is a certain irony in the ex-
tent to which the victims of its toils have brought their troubles upon 
themselves. For nearly a century, businessmen and their leaders have 
resisted the encroachment of federal legislation, and have carefully 
preserved a system of permissive corporation codes in the various 
states. As a price for their fifty permissive corporation systems, they 
now submit to forty-nine state securities law systems, overlaid with 
rigorous, duplicative, technical, and burdensome federal securities 
law. The combined system of corporation and securities laws is 
probably the strictest in the world, and certainly the most cumber-
some. 
V. THE SECURITIES TRANSFER LAWS 
Still another essential fragment of the law of corporations is the 
body of rules governing the evidence of ownership of investors' in-
terests, and the transfer of these interests. Thanks to some curious 
accidents of history, this fragment is embodied today in article 8 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 
One might wonder whether any special law of securities transfer 
is necessary. Would it not be sufficient to leave these interests to the 
general principles that govern the transfer of other property of the 
same general category? This is the solution in Germany where, de-
spite the Teutonic passion for codification, the transfer of shares is 
governed by the general principles of negotiable instruments (wert-
papiere).219 
278. For example, ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 509(a) (Tent. Draft No. I, 1972) 
offers the following formulation: 
[Secondary distributions.] (a) [Scope of section.] When (I) a distribution is 
solely by or for the account or benefit of a secondary distributor, (2) the issuer is 
a one-year registrant, and (3) the security was not the subject of a limited offer-
ing during the one-year period specified in section 227(b)(2), this section applied, 
at the election of the secondary distributor, instead of sections 501, 502(a), and 
503; and in that event sections 504(c), 505 (except 505(b)), 506 (except 506(a)), and 
507 (except 507(a)(2)) apply as if the secondary distributor were the issuer and the 
distribution statement were an offering statement (including a prospectus). 
279. AKTG § 68 (1965). See A. HUECK, R.EcHT DER WERTPAPIERE 16 (1967); A. HuECK, 
GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 123 (15th ed. 1970). England and France, in contrast, have several 
sections on share transfer, but less detail than the UCC. See Companies Act of 
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In the United States, legislatures moved more tortuously toward 
this position. The first provisions on transfer merely repelled the 
possible inferences that shares were "incorporeal hereditaments" 
transferable by the rules of real property,280 or that they were mere 
"choses in action" transferable only by the grace of equity.281 Cor-
poration codes up to the first decade of the twentieth century com-
monly provided that shares were personal property, and could be 
transferred on the books of the company.282 
These provisions proved insufficient. Frequently, share certificates 
that had been endorsed and sold were reclaimed by their former 
owners who claimed to have lost them by theft, fraud, or breach of 
trust. Judges attempted to solve the disputes by applying the prin-
ciples of apparent agency, estoppel, and indicia of mvnership, but 
never the rules of negotiable instruments. The results were con-
flicting and often unsatisfactory to the investment professionals.283 
Since the securities market is highly interstate, no solution under 
a single state's corporation code would have done much to relieve the 
uncertainties of brokers and bankers. It was a case for uniformity, 
and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws stepped quickly into 
the breach. In 1909, they promulgated the Uniform Stock Transfer 
Act, which became one of their most successful projects. In 1950, on 
the eve of adoption of the UCC, it was one of only two uniform com-
mercial laws that enjoyed nationwide acceptance.284 Its adoption by 
over fifty states and territories put it far ahead of the Uniform Sales 
Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and the Uniform Warehouse 
Receipts Act. Its interpretation had occasioned very little difficulty, 
and no one was demanding major changes in it. 285 
1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 73-85; sched. 1, table A, §§ 22-32; Law of July 24, 1966, 
on Business Associations, arts. 271-83, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
280. Since this was true of advowsons, offices, dignities, and annuities (2 W. BLACK• 
STONE, Co:M:MENTAIUES •2-43), it was not an inherently improbable status for shares-
especially if the principal property of the corporation was a mill, a turnpike, or a 
bridge. The English act also repels the possibility of shares being regarded as real 
property. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 73. 
281. See generally 0. MARsHALL, THE AssIGNMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION (1950); 
Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law, 
33 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1920). 
282. Act of March 7, 1901, ch. 166, §§ 16, 22, [1901] Del. Laws 261-63; Act of 
April 7, 1875, § 26, [1877] N.J. Rev. Stat. 181. Cf. Business Corp. Law of 1875, ch. 
611, § 12, [1875] N.Y. Stat. 223 (shares declared transferable, but not stated whether 
"personal property"). 
283. See w. CooK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL 
STOCK §§ 358-62, 365-70, 411-16 (6th ed. 1908). 
284. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 9-12 (Thompson Supp. 1968). 
285. Some minor changes were needed with regard to transfers of stock held in 
decedents' and trust estates, See Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 RoCKY MT, 
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However, the Commissioners became involved in the 1940's in 
rewriting the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. One of its dif-
ficulties was that its definition of "negotiable instrument" was broad 
enough to include some corporate bonds, but not broad enough to 
include all.280 Negotiability was deemed desirable for all bonds, but 
many other provisions appropriate to bills, notes, and checks (then 
called "negotiable instruments" and now called "commercial paper") 
were inappropriate for or inapplicable to corporate bonds. For ex-
ample, it ·would be outrageous to presume that someone who had 
written his name on the back of the bond meant to guarantee the 
payment of the principal.287 It would also be farfetched to say that 
negotiation of a bond after it was due gave notice of equitable de-
fenses. 288 Consequently, it was important to exclude bonds from the 
article on commercial paper, then being prepared for the new Uni-
form Commercial Code.289 
The Commissioners believed that if bonds were to be excluded 
from the law on commercial paper, they must be tucked into some 
other bed and not left out in the cold world of the common law. A 
logical refuge, in view of the similarities between stocks and bonds, 
was the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and the Commissioners under-
took to rewrite the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to include bonds as 
well as shares. 200 As a matter of legislative packaging, it also seemed 
convenient to put the new stock-and-bond transfer act into the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Through this train of accidents the law 
governing transfer of stock-although functionally closer to corpora-
tion acts and securities acts-found itself a bedfellow to those laws 
regulating sales, checks, bills of lading, and chattel credit. 
Article 8 was drafted under considerable difficulties. It was an 
afterthought, and the drafting committee included no one who had 
previously ·written on securities transfer.291 To aggravate their handi-
L. REV. 1 (1957); Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. L. 
REV. 843 (1958). 
286. Cosway, Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 16 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 284, 286 (1951); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial 
Code, 39 ORE. L. REv. 318, 328 (1960). 
287. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Acr §§ 63, 66 (adopted 1896, superseded by 
the UCC). 
288. See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Acr § 52(2). 
289. Cosway, supra note 286, at 285-86. 
290. Id. at 285-86; Malcolm, supra note 286, at 328-39. 
291. UNIFORM Co!IIMERCIAL CODE 9 (Official Text 1957) states that the committee 
was composed of Carlos Israels, Soia Mentschikoff, Eliot R. Thomas, and Fred B. Lund. 
Conspicuous among stock transfer writers who were not included nor apparently even 
consulted were Francis T. Christy, author of THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1st ed. 1929, 
5th ed. 1972); F. Hodge O'Neal, author of Restrictions on Transfers of Stock in 
670 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:621 
cap, the draftsmen cast aside the tested model of the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act and adopted new modes of expression based on the 
negotiable instruments article of the Code.292 Apparently, they 
thought that shares of stock, like negotiable instruments, have no 
existence apart from the paper evidencing them, and forgot that 
shares may exist, and are even required to exist, without certifi-
cates.293 Under the "final draft" of 1952, which the Pennsylvania 
legislature credulously adopted by unanimous vote,294 stock in the 
name of a decedent could not be transferred at all, since a transfer 
could be signed only by the owner named in the instrument.295 
Thanks to criticisms offered by the New York Law Revision Com-
mission296 and many others, article 8 was remolded into tolerable 
form,297 and has now been adopted (like the rest of the UCC) in all 
Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 773 (1952); B.F. 
Cataldo, author of Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporations, 37 VA, L. 
R.Ev. 229 (1951); Berto Rogers and Carter Chinnis, authors of Stock Transfer Under 
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and Nominee Statutes, 7 WASH. & LEE L. R.Ev. 150 (1950); 
and Frank L. Dewey, author of Transfer Agent's Dilemma-Conflicting Claims to 
Shares of Stock, 52 HARV. L. R.Ev. 553 (1939). 
292. Section 1 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act distinguished between the "certi• 
ficate" (a piece of paper) and the "share" (a bundle of proprietary rights), and stated 
explicitly that the share as well as the certificate pass by a proper transfer. Similiar 
terminology is used in the English Companies Act of 1948 with respect to shares and 
debentures alike (II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 80-81). 
In contrast, article 8 employs the term "security" ambiguously. Although section 
8-102 defines "security" as the paper, section 8-301 on transfer must be construed to 
include the rights as well; otherwise the Code remains silent on the transfer of the 
shares and obligations, while promulgating insiguificant rules on the transfer of paper. 
Article 8 also declares that securities "are negotiable instruments" (section 8-105(1)). 
However, the purpose of this declaration is not disclosed, for the term "negotiable 
instruments" is not used elsewhere in the article, and securities are expressly ex-
cluded from article 3 (section 3-103), which governs traditional "negotiable instru-
ments." Perhaps it is to be read as a sort of credo, announcing allegiance to the basic 
identity of investment securities and banking documents. 
293. The widely copied Model Business Corporation Act specifically forbids the 
issuance of certificates for shares which are not fully paid for, while impliedly recog-
nizing that such shares may exist and be voted. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr 
§ 17 (calls for payments on shares); § 23 (no certificate issued for shares until fully 
paid) (1969). 
294. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
127 (1953). 
295. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-308 (Official Draft 1952): "An indorsement of 
a security in registered form is made when the person specified by the terms of the 
instrument • • • to be entitled to the security signs . • • ." This was later amended to 
list other persons (including an executor, administrat<>r, guardian, etc.) who could 
indorse. The draftsmen would have been alerted to this problem if they had consulted 
the English Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 76. Section 2 of the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act had expressly mentioned executors and othrr personal representa-
tives with an implication of authority to indorse. 
296. 2 N.Y. LAW REvisION COMMISSION, REPORT 1877-2004 (1953) (comments); N.Y. 
LAW R.EvISION COMMISSION, REPORT 50-64 (1954) (conclusions). 
297. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Official Text 1958). There remain ~ections 
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states but Louisiana. It does the job of providing a uniform, read-
able, and readily available code of transfer, applicable equally to 
bonds and to shares of capital stock. 
VI. THE .ANTITRUST LAWS 
One usually thinks of antitrust laws as dealing with practices or 
agreements that directly affect prices. Illustrations run from the 
agreements of railroads to fix freight rates298 to a manfacturer's 
"franchising" system that restricts the sales territories of distribu-
tors. 299 Although these laws apply more often to corporations than to 
anyone else, they are not in any sense "corporation laws." 
But there is another branch of the antitrust laws that deals 
directly with corporate structure, through provisions on trusts, stock 
holdings, and mergers. In these areas, the antitrust laws virtually 
contradict the corporation codes. 
The corporation codes, for example, provide that groups of share-
holders may transfer their shares to trustees, who will vote them on 
behalf of the shareholders, and receive trust certificates in ex-
change for their stock.300 But the Sherman Antitrust Act makes 
such an arrangement illegal if shares of competing corporations are 
placed in the same trust with a view to reducing competition.301 
While modem corporation laws provide without qualification that a 
corporation may hold shares in other corporations,302 the antitrust 
laws declare that such a purchase of securities is unlawful if it may 
tend to injure competition.303 And even though modem corporation 
laws provide that a company may sell its entire assets to another, or 
merge with another, on obtaining the requisite number of favorable 
that have been changed for the worse from their Uniform Stock Transfer Act pre-
decessors, for instance section 8-204 (restriction effective although not printed on 
certificate when buyer has knowledge) and section 8-317 (attachment invalid unless 
certificate is physically seized). See UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT §§ Ill, 15. 
298. See United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
299. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
300. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1971); ABA-ALI 
MoDEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 34 (1969). 
301. Sherman Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). For a description of the Standard Oil 
Trust that inspired the "trust" terminology of this law, see Larson, The Rise of Big 
Business in the Oil Industry, in CENTENNIAL SEMINAR OF THE PETROLEUM INDUsrRY, 
OIL'S FIRST CENTURY 27 (1960). 
302. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1971); ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. 
ACT § 4(g) (1969). 
303. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). The 
most famous application of the original section is United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours &: Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (du Pont held 23 per cent of General Motor's 
stock). 
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votes from its shareholders and filing the proper papers,304 one rely-
ing on this authorization might find his transaction illegal if the 
merger he had effectuated would tend to lessen competition in inter-
state commerce.305 
As a matter of history, the "trust" in a formal sense does not seem 
to have been a widely used method of restraining trade or creating 
monopoly either before or after enactment of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. However, it was employed from 1882 to 1892 by Standard Oi1300 
-the most notorious of the industrial monsters of the later nine-
teenth century-and so became a nickname for business combina-
tions of all shapes.307 Reflecting this popular usage, and with the 
Standard Oil instance clearly in mind, Congress in the Sherman Act 
of 1890 denounced "[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,"308 and the 
term "antitrust" became firmly attached to American rules in defense 
of competition. 
For the next twenty-four years, the path of corporate empire was 
characterized by holding companies, rather than by associations or 
trusts. Standard's quick switch from trust to holding company3°0 did 
not save it from conviction and dismemberment, but the opinion 
condemning Standard indicated that a holding company of competi-
tors would not be a per se violation in the absence of the high degree 
of domination and the history of price-fixing that characterized Stan-
dard.310 
Congressmen-or a majority of them-concluded that a more 
positive prohibition of holding company structures that would re-
strain competition should be enacted. In 1914--three years after the 
Standard Oil Co. decision-Congress, through the Clayton Act, for-
bade the acquisition of stock in other corporations where the effect 
304. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1971); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoIU>. 
Acr § 79 (1969). 
305. Clayton Act § 7, as amended by Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)). See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 
U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
306. Standard Oil was first organized as a trade association in 1874, and converted 
to a formal trust in 1882. See generally 1 A. NEVINS, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 603 (1940); 
2 id. at 140; 2 I. TARBELL, THE HlsrORY OF THE STANDARD OlL Co. 364 (1904); Larson, 
supra note 301. 
307. See generally w. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 214-45 (1891); Jenks, The 
Development of the Whiskey Trust, in W. RIPLEY, TRusrs, PooLS AND CORPORATIONS 
22-45 (1905). 
308. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis added). 
309 See authorities cited in note 306 supra. 
310. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 75 (1911). 
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"may be to substantially lessen competition."311 From 1914 on, the 
preferred method of combining enterprises was not to form holding 
companies, as had been done by Standard Oil of New Jersey, but to 
purchase assets, or to "merge." General Motors, which had purchased 
stock in Buick and Cadillac in 1908 and 1909, purchased assets of 
Chevrolet and United Motors in 1916 and 1918.312 American corpo-
ration codes sprouted detailed provisions for "merger and consolida-
tion" and "sale of assets," which had no parallel in foreign legisla-
tion. sis 
It was 1950 before Congress again found itself in the mood to re-
strain the buildup of corporate giants, although it was an open secret 
that the Clayton Act was being evaded by mergers and consolidations. 
In the course of the Truman "Fair Deal," Senator Kefauver and 
Congressman Celler teamed up to push through the "Celler-Kefauver 
bill," which forbade acquisitions of assets that might impair com-
petition.314 Since 1950, corporate amalgamators have increasingly 
shunned combinations in the same line of business and have turned 
their ingenuity toward the "conglomerate merger," thus giving birth 
to a whole new line of thinking about "any line of commerce in any 
section of the country."315 
As with the securities laws, the corporate structure provisions of 
the antitrust laws are hidden far from the habitual paths of a cor-
poration lawyer. Like many other provisions of federal law, they seem 
better designed to trap the unwary than to forewarn the dissuadable 
malefactor. 
No other nation has adopted anything very close to the structural 
provisions of the United States antitrust laws. Many of them en-
couraged, rather than discouraged, restraints on competition until 
311. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 73, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Congress 
removed the split infinitive in the 1950 amendments. 
312. L. SEL'IZER, A FINANCIAL HlsrORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 151-
58 (1928). However, instances of stock purchase continued. General Motors bought 
Fisher Body shares, and Chevrolet bought controlling shares of General Motors shortly 
before General Motors bought Chevrolet's assets and dissolved the company (id. at 
180-81). Moreover, du Pont bought shares of General Motors (id. at 190-91); this was 
found four decades later to have been a Clayton Act violation (United States v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)). 
313. Before adoption of the business associations law of 1966, the French corporation 
law had no explicit provisions on merger or sales of assets. See Conard, Corporate 
Fusion in the Common Market, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 584 (1966). 
314. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)). 
315. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See Hampton, The Merger Movement 
in Historic Perspective-A Lawyer's View, 25 Bus. LAw. 653 (1970) (part of a long 
symposium on conglomerate mergers). 
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quite recently.am Since 1957, there has been a sudden surge of interest 
in antitrust laws in the countries of Western Europe, because of a 
general inhibition on restraints in trade in the Treaty of Rome, 
which established the European Economic Community.317 But there 
is no such inhibition on acquisitions or mergers. The most the Treaty 
does in this direction is to prohibit enterprises from taking "im-
proper advantage of a dominant position.''318 Apparently, the Com-
mon Market Commission intends to interpret this clause in a way 
that would inhibit the formation of a monopoly, but this does not 
come close to the American prohibitions.319 
VII. TAX LAWS 
Whatever taxes touch, they in some measure deform or reform. 
Thus, family exemptions become a factor encouraging the growth of 
families, and the absence of such exemptions becomes a penalty on 
raising families. However, among the myriad tax provisions affecting 
human behavior, one can distinguish those that are relatively neutral 
from those that, by accident or design, strongly impel a specific 
course of conduct. I will mention some of the provisions of tax law 
that have a conspicuously coercive effect on corporation procedures. 
A. Stock Option Rules 
Foremost among the tax rules that shape corporate operations are 
those relating to "employee stock options.''320 When legislative ap-
proval was awarded to employee stock option plans in 1950,321 tax 
rates for ordinary income ranged up to eighty-seven per cent,322 but 
stock option income would incur a maximum rate of only thirty per 
cent.323 These facts alone would have made stock options alluring. 
316. See Riesenfeld, The Protection of Competition, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN 
THE EUROPEAN Co11rMoN MARKET 197 (E. Stein &: T. Nicholson ed. 1960). 
317. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 
85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47. 
318. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, l\Iarch 25, 1957, art. 
86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48. 
319. Decision of Dec. 9, 1971 (Continental Can Co.), 15 E.E.C. J.O. L7 /25 (1972), 
CCH COMM. l\IKT. REP. 1J 9481 (1971). 
320. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421·25. 
321. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, tit. II, 
§ 218, 64 Stat. 942. 
322. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 12(f), added by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, tit. I, 
§ 10l(b)(4), 64 Stat. 911. 
323. Originally the maximum rate on long-term capital gains was 30 per cent, Int. 
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, §§ 117(b)-(c), 53 Stat. 51. However, the maximum rate was 
reduced to 25 per cent in 1954. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 1201, 68A Stat. 320, 
as amended, !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1201. 
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Yet, they had the additional nontax attraction-probably not rec-
ognized by the enacting Congress-that the amount of income 
derived need never be reported to shareholders, or even be estimated. 
The shareholders would be told how many shares were under option, 
and at what prices, but were never specifically informed of the gains 
that the beneficiaries actually realized.324 
By the early 1970's, the attractiveness of stock options relative to 
other forms of compensation had been reduced. Maximum tax rates 
on the salaries and bonuses of executives had dropped to fifty per 
cent,325 and taxes on capital gains from stock options could rise as 
high as thirty-five per cent.326 But it was still a preferential way of 
obtaining income,327 and still escaped a disclosure of the amount of 
enrichment realized. 
The stock options provisions are a striking example of laws whose 
primary result was to mold corporate procedures. They provided an 
almost irresistible impulse to turn part of executive compensation 
from cash into investment opportunities, and thereby to conceal from 
shareholders the amounts by which executives are enriched. These 
results did not flow from the application to corporation executives 
of tax rules that applied equally to others; on the contrary, they 
flowed from a special set of rules applicable only to this special set 
of people.828 
The specialness of the legislation was emphasized by several pro-
visions that have no relevance to revenue considerations, but were 
324. Since the principal benefit of stock options comes from price appreciation, it 
never appears in the company accounts as an expense, although it represents a 
lost opportunity for gain to the corporation. For an analysis of this problem, see D. 
Sweeney, Accounting for Stock Options, Michigan Business Studies, vol. 14, no. 5 
(1960). 
325. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1348, added by Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-172, tit. VIII, § 804(a), 83 Stat. 685. 
326. The computations to reach this result are rather complex, so the following 
description is simplified. In 1969 the maximum rates on ordinary income were reduced 
to 70 per cent. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. VIII, § 803(a), 83 Stat. 678, 
amending INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § I. The allowance for a deduction of one half of 
long-term capital gains remained unamended. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1202. However, 
the alternative tax, which had previously imposed a maximum rate of 25 per cent on 
long-term capital gains, was amended to become inapplicable by 1972 when long-term 
capital gains exceeded 50,000 dollars. The maximum rate of 70 per cent combined with 
the one-half deduction allows for an effective maximum rate of 35 per cent on long-
term capital gains. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. V, § 5ll(b), 83 Stat. 
635, amending INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1201. 
327. For a thumbnail sketch of the tax workings of stock options, see H. HENN, 
supra note 58, § 248; 2 G. WASHINGTON&: V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE 
ExEcUTIVE 569-612 (3d ed. 1962). 
328. It has been argued that stock options were necessary to equalize executives 
with shareholders, who enjoy capital gains treatment. But shareholders do not ha,c 
options to buy stock at the market price of one to five years earlirr. 
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obviously designed to protect shareholders' interests. For example, to 
receive the Code's blessing, a stock option plan must have the ap-
proval of shareholders329 and must be exercised while the beneficiary 
is working for the corporation, or within three months thereafter.330 
B. Pass-Through Tax Regime 
Another segment of the Internal Revenue Code exerting a direct 
and deliberate influence on corporate behavior is subchapter S,331 
which permits "certain small business corporations" to elect a favored 
tax status. An enterprise that conforms to these prescriptions may 
attribute its earnings (for tax purposes) directly to the shareholders, 
and escape the separate tax on corporate income.332 The profits are 
treated as "passing through" the corporation to the shareholders, 
whether or not they are actually distributed. In order to receive these 
benefits, the corporation must (1) restrict its shareholders to ten per-
sons or less, (2) restrict its capital shares to a single class, and (3) 
exclude corporations, business associations, trusts, estates, and non-
resident aliens from shareholding.333 
The apparent purpose of subchapter S is to achieve, in a limited 
sector, tax neutrality between the corporate and the partnership forms 
of organization-to let a closely held enterprise decide between part-
nership and corporate form without regard to the impact of federal 
tax law.334 The limits on membership are presumably designed to 
prevent the hiding of profits among shareholders too numerous to 
trace easily, or to confine subchapter S to enterprises that have a real 
potential for operating as partnerships. However, if an enterprise 
once succumbs to the attractions of subchapter S, its structural mobil-
ity is restricted severely,335 and far beyond any realistic criterion of 
susceptibility to tax evasion. In particular, the limitation to ten share-
holders inhibits the normal dispersion of shares among employees and 
among children and grandchildren of the founders. Moreover, some 
329. INT, R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(l). 
330. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 422(a)(2). 
331. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79. 
332. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1372(b), 1373(a). But large capital gains may incur 
a corporate tax. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1378. 
333. !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 137I(a). 
334. Congress never declared its reasons for adopting these provisions, which ap-
peared in neither the House nor Senate bills but first emerged in the conference report 
with a laconic summary devoid of economic justification. H.R. REP. No. 2632, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1958). 
335. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPORATIONs: LAw AND PRACTICE § 2.04b (2d ed. 1971). 
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of the principal modes of financing small businesses-through blocks 
of common or preferred stock sold to investment companies-are cut 
off.asa 
Fortunately, these restrictive consequences are suffered by only 
a small percentage of the corporations that are invited to incur them. 
There are about 1.33 million corporations with no more than ten 
shareholders,337 but only about 200,000 choose to report their taxable 
incomes under subchapter S.338 The others may well be deterred not 
only by the inconveniences mentioned, but also by some special tax 
exposures of subchapter S corporations, and, above all, by the mere 
complications of maintaining eligibility and filing returns under 
these provisions.339 
C. Tax-Free Reorganizations 
A third area in which the Internal Revenue Code imposes de-
tailed rules of procedure on corporations is the one defining tax-free 
reorganizations. Under general principles of taxation, the exchange 
of one kind of property for another is a taxable event. This principle, 
if left to run its course, would have a dampening effect on the ag-
glomerative growth of corporations, or drive them to seek subterfuges 
such as the management-sharing and profit-splitting arrangements 
common in Germany.340 Taking a favorable view of corporate ag-
glomeration, the lawmakers have provided a set of formulas designed 
to comprise nearly every legitimate need of reorganization. 
Although these provisions are tolerant in the sense that they 
permit amalgamation in a wide variety of circumstances, they are 
meticulous in forcing reorganizations into specific formulas. For ex-
ample, if corporation X, which has voting and nonvoting stock out-
standing, wants to absorb corporation Y, which also has voting and 
nonvoting stock, X might reasonably offer to exchange voting shares 
in X for voting shares in Y, and nonvoting shares in X for nonvoting 
shares in Y. But this would miss the definition of a class B reorganiza-
336. See generally Symposium, Venture Capital for Business, 24 Bus. L\W. 935 (1969); 
Symposium, Where To Look for l\Ioney, 9 PRAc. LAW., May 1963, at 15; Noone, The 
1968 Model SBTC, 23 Bus. I.Aw. 1214 (1968). 
337. This estimate is based on a pilot survey by the author that is to be published 
elsewhere. 
338. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTERNAL R.EvENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME 
1968: CoRPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS 148 (1970). 
339. F. O'Neal, supra note 335, § 2.04b. 
340. See generally Lutter, A European Contractual Group-Company, 9 CoMM. 
MKT. L. REV. 53 (1972), 25 REVUE TRI:'.IIESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL l (1972). 
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tion;341 the lawyers must restructure the plan so that only voting 
shares of X are exchanged. Alternatively, X might reasonably offer its 
two classes of stock for assets instead of stock, but this would miss 
qualification as a tax-free reorganization unless eighty per cent of the 
property received was exchanged for voting stock.342 Through these 
measures, the Treasury exerts the weight of its taxing power on the 
corporation's choice of investment media. 
Besides forcing reorganizations into particular molds, these tax 
provisions impel small corporation owners to amalgamate their busi-
nesses with those of others, rather than selling out for cash, which 
would trigger large, immediate tax liabilities. In this way, it favors 
the snowballing of bigger and bigger enterprises, in preference to 
selling small enterprises in their existing dimensions. 
D. Other Income Tax Rules Affecting Corporate Structure 
Aside from the tax provisions mentioned above, which specify in 
detail how a corporation shall behave, there are many other provi-
sions of the federal income tax law that are stated in more general 
terms but have powerful effects on corporate behavior and structure. 
Foremost, perhaps, is the deduction of interest payments,343 which 
rewards corporations for financing with debt capital instead of 
equity capital.344 This feature turns principles of prudent manage-
ment upside down, inducing "thin incorporation" far beyond the 
limits commended by the advantages of "trading on the equity." 
Close behind the interest deduction is the indulgent taxation of 
capital gains, 345 which rewards shareholders for keeping profits in the 
corporation (so as to enhance the value of the shares, which may be 
sold for capital gains), and discourages distributions to the share-
holders (in whose hands they would be taxed at ordinary income 
rates). 
During the 1940's and 1950's, the maximum tax rate on ordinary 
income was more than three times the rate on capital gains.346 As a 
result, taxation, rather than the relative utility of funds to the com-
pany or its shareholders, tended to dominate dividend policy. During 
the 1960's, the gap was narrowed by reductions in ordinary income 
341. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l)(B). 
342. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(l)(C), (a)(2)(B). 
343. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163. See also INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 385. 
344. See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA• 
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.01 (3d ed. 1971). 
345. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02. 
346. See notes 321-26 supra and accompanying text. 
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rates,347 and by- increases in capital gains rates;348 recent political 
declamations concerning tax reform indicate that the narrowing of 
the gap is likely to continue. Consequently, tax favoritism to capital 
gains is a diminishing factor in corporate financial policy. 
A third feature of taxation that molds corporate behavior is the 
relationship benveen corporate and individual income taxes. Under 
the American system of "double taxation," corporate income is taxed 
to the corporation, and dividends are taxed to the shareholders with-
out any allowance for the tax already paid by the corporation. This 
presents a contrast with the French system, in which the tax paid by 
the corporation is treated as a "prepayment" of the shareholder's tax 
on dividend income.349 
One effect of the American system is to create a powerful impulse 
to draw money out of the corporation by salaries (which reduce the 
corporation tax) rather than by dividends. It also creates an impulse 
for corporations to reinvest their own profits, rather than to distrib-
ute them to shareholders for reinvestment. 
The result of these impacts of federal tax law (reinforced by many 
others) is that nearly every step of corporate organization and finance 
is influenced primarily by tax considerations, and secondarily by 
market considerations. Accordingly, the corporate planner must move 
not merely with the corporation code in one hand and the securities 
laws in the other, but with the Internal Revenue Code and regula-
tions within easy reach. From this challenging situation no country 
is completely free, but there are some that have made greater efforts 
to achieve tax neutrality. 
E. Capital Stock Taxes 
Another set of taxes that exert a persuasive influence on the struc-
ture of some corporations are the state taxes on authorization, issu-
ance, and transfer of capital stock. Illustrative is the Delaware tax 
on authorized capital, payable when the corporation is first organized, 
and at each later date when the capital is increased.350 This tax is not 
347. The ma.ximum rate on personal income dropped from 88 per cent in 1963 to 
70 per cent in 1965 and later years, with proportionate reductions at all levels. For a 
summary, see CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ,r,r 152-53A. 
348. See note 326 supra. 
349. WORLD TA.X SERIES, TAXATION IN FRANCE § 9/2.12 (1966). For a comparison of 
various European systems, see Vogelaar, Tax Harmonization in the European Com-
munity, 7 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 323, 328 (1970); Van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and 
Individual Income Tax in the European Communities, in CoMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN CoMMUNmES STUDIES: COMPEITilON-APPRO.xIMATION OF LEGISLATION SERIES No. 
15 (1970). 
350. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 391 (Supp. 1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971). 
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related in any way to actual value or sales price of the shares; when 
shares have par value, it is based simply on the aggregate par value. 
When they have no-par value, it is based simply on number of shares. 
The tax is slightly lower on no-par shares than on one-hundred-
dollar par shares, but much lower if ten-dollar par or one-dollar par 
shares are used. The comparative tax burdens are as follows: 
100,000,000 shares of par value $100 
100,000,000 shares of no-par value 
100,000,000 shares of par value $10 
100,000,000 shares of par value $1 
$210,960 
$201,050 
$ 20,700 
$ 2,700 
Taxes under this plan, which may be found in several other 
states,351 have an obvious tendency to favor the use of low-par value 
shares, but the weight of their impact on selection of par values is 
difficult to assess. Certainly the use of low-par stock is the prevailing 
practice today, but there is at least one other factor impelling cor-
porations in the same direction-the fact that an automatic "surplus" 
appears on the company accounts when par values are below the price 
of issue.352 Most corporations refrain from fixing par values at one 
tenth or one one-hundredth of a cent,353 which they might well do if 
tax-saving were their sole motivation. 
VIII. STOCK EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS 
A. Are They Laws? 
On the fringe of norms that can be called "laws of corporations" 
are the requirements of structure and practice imposed by stock ex-
changes. The best known of these requirements are those promul-
gated by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and published in its 
Company Manual,354 which explain what a company must do and be 
to obtain listing on the Exchange and to avoid delisting. 
351. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12201 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAW § 180 (Mc-
Kinney 1966). 
352. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (Supp. 1968); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. 
Am: § 21 (1969). 
353. This is a casual observation, based on examining numerous corporation reports 
without tallying numbers on this point. 
354. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 155. The Manual consists of principles 
that are not phrased as commands, but as policies embodied in the "listing agreement" 
to which the issuers of listed securities must subscribe. The Cdmpany Manual should 
be distinguished from the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange that govern conduct 
of the member brokers, rather than of the companies listed. 
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Stock exchange requirements are not "laws" in the formal sense 
of enactments of the legislature. They are, nevertheless, rules of uni-
form application to a broad category of companies. Several of the 
rules involve the structure of the company in such a way that lawyers 
must think of them long before they seek exchange listing. If they 
are not "laws," they are at least rules that a company founder ought 
to think about at the same time he is thinking about statutory pro-
visions.8511 
Requirements of the NYSE comprised in the Company Manual 
may be divided roughly between those regulating a company's 
relationship with the Exchange as an institution and those governing 
its relationship with its shareholders. The former are not "laws of 
corporations" in the sense in which I use the term; an instance is the 
requirement of direct notification to the NYSE in regard to financial 
events.856 But the rules governing the relationship of shareholders 
with their corporations deal with exactly the type of questions that 
corporation codes normally govern. Among the most obvious ex-
amples are rules requiring that common shareholders have full voting 
rights and that preferred shareholders have voting rights on default 
of dividends; and rules concerning notices of shareholders' meetings, 
notices of redemptions, and notices of rights to subscribe; and rules 
regulating accounting for stock dividends.357 A considerable number 
of these rules duplicate or reinforce the rules and regulations im-
posed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 358 Others go be-
yond them.350 
355. Although exchange rules apply only to companies that have voluntarily listed 
their securities on exchanges, this limitation does not distinguish them from true 
"laws." From 1934 until 1964, the principal rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 applied only to listed companies. See Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 
3(c), 78 Stat. 566, adding Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) 
(1970). 
356. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 155, § AG. 
357. Id. § AS, at A-131 (publication of meeting notice), § AlO, at A-170 to 71 
(notice of redemption), § All, at A-185 to 86 (notice of rights of subscription), § AI3 
(accounting for stock dividends), § Al5, at A-280 to 82 (voting rights). Compare the 
French requirements, Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 174 (voting 
rights), art. 189 (notice of rights of subscription), [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] J.C.P. III. 
No. 32197; Decree of March 23, 1967, art. 30 (publication of meeting notice), art. 156 
(notice of rights of subscription), [1967] J.O. 2843, [1967] J.C.P. III. No. 32897. 
358. See, e.g., NYSE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 155, § A4, at A-64 to -69; Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1972) (both require sub-
mission of annual reports to shareholders). 
359. The requirements on voting rights furnish the best example. See note 360 
infra and accompanying text. 
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B. Voting Rights 
Among the most law-like provisions of the NYSE company laws 
are those that relate to the voting rights of shareholders. These re-
quire that common shares listed on the Exchange have full voting 
rights; listed preferred shares have rights to vote in case of default 
in dividends; shares not be burdened with a voting trust or irre-
vocable proxy; and stockholders be permitted to vote on acquisitions 
of property that involve an increase of twenty per cent of the out-
standing shares.860 
Because of these rules the generous state corporation code provi-
sions, which permit issuance of shares of any class with or without 
voting rights,861 are something of a snare and a delusion. When a 
company seeks to register its nonvoting shares on the Exchange, they 
will have to be given voting rights, and this will probably require 
compensating the shares that already have voting privileges for their 
"loss of control."862 
The provision requiring shareholder approval of a twenty per 
cent or greater stock increase in exchange for assets is a particularly 
interesting qualification of the freedom of American corporation 
codes. France requires an exchange of shares for property specifically 
to be approved by the shareholders,863 and Germany by the super-
visory council,864 but typical United States laws permit stock to be 
issued for property on the mere decision of the board of directors.365 
As a result, companies can acquire assets that may greatly alter the 
character of the company without any consultation of the share-
holders. 366 The NYSE policy has the effect of negating this freedom 
360. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 155, § A15, at A-280 to 85. 
361. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 242{a)(3) (Supp. 1968); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. 
CoRP. Aar § 15 (1969). 
362. See Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
372 U.S. 941 (1963), in which voting shares received a stock dividend of approximately 
9300 per cent in exchange for sharing their voting power with common shareholders. 
363. Law of July 24, 1966, on Business Associations, art. 193, [1966] J.O. 6402, [1966] 
J.C.P. III. No. 32197. 
364. AKTG § 205 (1965). 
365. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Supp. 1968), § 153 (Supp. 1971); ABA·ALI 
MonEL Bus. CoRP. Aar §§ 18-19 (1969). 
366. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (Ch. 1962), afjd., 
41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Although the objections in this case 
were to the company's selling its assets, the reasoning is equally applicable to the 
company's purchasing. Purchases without consulting shareholders have, however, been 
enjoined where the stock to be issued would increase the outstanding shares by more 
than 100 per cent. In such cases, sometimes called "upside-down transactions," the 
company that is nominally "acquiring'' another is more realistically being acquired 
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with regard to companies subject to its rules. They have to obtain 
their shareholders' consent when effectuating an acquisition that 
amounts to a fifth or more of their capital. 
C. Share Certificates, Their Issue and Transfer 
Other law-like provisions in the Company Manual relate to the 
issuance and transfer of share certificates; they are the only visible 
rubric for practices that are religiously observed by major corpora-
tions. The corporate codes say nothing about the form of stock certi-
ficates or how they are transferred.367 In contrast, the NYSE requires 
that certificates be printed from engraved steel plates, with a pictorial 
vignette embodying a human figure;868 for the registration and trans-
fer of these certificates, there must be a transfer office and an inde-
pendent registrar, located in the financial district of New York.869 
The practices imposed by the Exchange have become a standard of 
conduct for nearly all publicly held companies. 
D. Other Exchanges and Over-the-Counter Securities 
Exchanges other than the NYSE do not publish company man-
uals, and one cannot speak so authoritatively of what they re-
quire. However, they all have listing officials who impose on listed 
companies the requirements of company practice that they think are 
suitable.870 In general, these conform to the standards of the NYSE. 
By this means, the requirements contained in the NYSE Company 
Manual have become a code of practice for all listed companies. 
With regard to companies whose shares are traded "over-the-
counter," the picture is more mixed. The larger of these companies 
generally comply with the standards that the NYSE has set up. But 
there is infinite variation. There occasionally appear on the over-the-
counter market companies with no standards at all, and even a 
dubious existence.871 
by the other's shareholders. For examples, see Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 
1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 
(1958). 
367. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 158 (Supp. 1968); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. 
Acr § 23 (1969). 
368. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 155, § Al2(1I), at A-219 to 20. 
369. Id. § AI, at A-3 to -7. 
370. See Halsted, Rules and Regulations of the Midwest Stock Exchange, 1961 U. 
ILL. L.F. 257. 
371. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKEi' 603-04 (1967). 
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IX. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 
Many accounting principles are not so much matters of corpora-
tion law as of corporation housekeeping. Accounts should be kept 
accurately and balanced regularly in order that a corporation may 
know how its business is_progressing, and whether funds are leaking 
away. But these are rules for its own guidance rather than impera-
tives affecting its relationships with the government or with investors 
and customers. 
There are other accounting principles-particularly those per-
taining to financial statements-which have a great deal of legal 
force behind them. These principles are not concerned merely with 
recording correct figures; rather, they determine, for instance, 
whether assets acquired in exchange for shares should be entered on 
the balance sheet at their existing book values, or at new values that 
reflect the value of the stock exchanged for them. The larger of these 
figures will result in higher depreciation charges, possibly wiping out 
profits and making dividend payment illegal.372 If the wrong figures 
are entered, officials may become liable to buyers of the company's 
securities for vast amounts.373 
Because of the liabilities imposed on corporations and their 
officials for misleading financial statements, the principles that deter-
mine what forms of statement are permissible are just as coercive of 
human conduct as the rules defining larceny. They are, however, 
somewhat harder to find. Nowhere does the law expressly identify 
these principles, or say who has authority to announce them. But the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1938 furnished some guid-
ance in this area when it declared, 
[W]here financial statements filed with this Commission ... are pre-
pared in accordance with accounting principles for which there is no 
substantial authoritative support, such financial statements will be 
presumed to be misleading or inaccurate .... 374 
In response to this often echoed and generally accepted view, corpora-
tions and their accountants are in a tireless search for "generally ac-
cepted accounting principles"-a phrase that has become a term of 
art. 
372. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, .AMERICAN INmTUTE OF CERTIFIED Punuc 
AccouNTANTs (APB, AICPA), BUSINESS COMBINATIONS (1970) (APB Opinion No. 16); 
Watt, Pooling of Interest Concept Validated, 26 Bus. LAw. 215 (1970); Schapiro, Com-
ment, id. at 285; Bilyou, Pooling-Excesses and Solutions, id. at 297. 
373. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), imposing 
liability for losses sustained by purchasers of a bond issue under section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). 
374. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (April 28, 1938). 
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Before the SEC spoke, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICP A) was already seeking to distill a consensus on 
points not covered or not agreed on in the standard texts and hand-
books of accountancy. It had begun in 1932 its Accounting Research 
Bulletins,m which continued until they were succeeded in 1962 by 
the current series, called Opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board.376 
By 1965, the bulletins and opinions had dealt with many of the 
especially troublesome problems of accounting, but they still fell 
short of being an accounting bible. They lacked specificity in some 
areas, they failed to articulate many basic assumptions, and they 
lacked transitional comment to knit the opinions together. To fill 
these voids, the AICPA in 1965 issued its Inventory of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles.377 This document and the Account-
ing Principles Board (APB) opinions that supplement it are generally 
followed by corporation Ia-wyers with the same respect (and some-
times the same reluctance) as regulations of the SEC.378 After the 
appearance of three opinions bearing heavily on some of the account-
ing practices that had favored conglomerate takeovers,379 financiers 
were heard to say that the accountants had "closed the door" on fur-
ther mergers. The true influence of these opinions is difficult to weigh 
because their appearance was concurrent with a general deflation of 
stock market prices and the Tax Reform Act of 1969,380 and followed 
upon some pronouncements against conglomerate mergers by the 
Antitrust Division and by the Supreme Court.381 
Perhaps the fairest statement of the weight of the APB opinions 
is that they operate as presumptions. The SEC and most courts may 
be expected to assume, until it is proved otherwise, that financial 
statements in accordance with APB principles are accurate and in-
375. AICPA, AccouNTING R.EsEARCH BULLETINS, Nos. 1-53 (1939-1961). Numbers 1-42 
of this series were consolidated and restated by No. 43 (1953). In 1961, No. 43 was 
reprinted with the rest of the series (Nos. 44-51) and certain other items as Ac-
COUNTING REsEARCH AND TERMINOLOGY BULLETINS. 
376. To date, 22 opinions have been issued by the Accounting Principles Board. 
377. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISF.S (1965) (AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 7). 
378. The inventory, the opinions, and related documents are conveniently assembled 
in a CCH looseleaf service entitled APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES. 
379. APB, AICPA, ACCOUNTING FOR CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND DEBT !ssUED wrrH 
STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS (1969) (APB Opinion No. 14); APB, AICPA, EARNINGS PER 
SHARE (1969) (APB Opinion No. 15); APB, AICPA, BusrNESS COMBINATIONS (1970) (APB 
Opinion No. 16). 
380. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 492. 
381. See FTC v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (acquisition of Clorox). 
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formative, and that statements in disaccord are inaccurate and mis-
leading. 
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory in various ways. For one, 
businessmen cannot be quite sure whether adherence to the APB 
opinions will in the end be held sufficient, or whether the SEC and 
the courts will impose different standards. For another, government 
and private representatives are not quite sure that accountants-who 
compose the Accounting Principles Board-are free from biases re-
sulting from their mvn professional interests, or from the interests of 
the corporation officers who are their principal clients. The Institute 
recognized these problems (and others), and appointed a special 
committee to report on how and by whom accounting principles 
should be established. In March 1972, it produced a thoughtful 
report that proposed the creation of a Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board of full-time, salaried members, only part of whom need 
be accountants.382 Their study and proposal seem certain to provoke 
further evolution in the development of the laws of corporations 
governing financial disclosures. 
X. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 
Few, if any, lawyers could sincerely deny that the laws of corpora-
tions are a maze of meaningless multiplicity, teeming with contradic-
tions and conflicts. But many can be found to deny that there is any 
exit from the maze. 
The most obvious problem is the multiplicity of divergent state 
corporation code provisions, but this is only one of many. There is 
also the diversity of state judge-made laws, and the diversity of blue 
sky laws. The interlock and overlap between corporation codes, 
judge-made laws, securities laws, antitrust laws, and tax laws are 
additional sources of confusion. 
There are also problems involving the quality of these laws. With 
respect to the state corporation codes, there is the notorious permis-
siveness. With respect to the federal securities laws, there is the ab-
struseness of their formulation plus the Commission's practice of 
extending their scope by menacing releases. With respect to the 
antitrust laws, there is the restless movement of meaning that results 
382. AICP A, EsrABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS! R.EI'OR.T OF THE STUDY 
ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1972). This is sometimes known as the 
"Wheat Report" after its chairman, but must be distinguished from another famous 
"Wheat Report" that is more properly designated as SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COM· 
MISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS! A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL AD'MINISTRATIVE POLICIES 
UNDER. THE '33 AND '34 Acrs (1969). 
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from the courts' acceptance of the shifting policies of the Antitrust 
Division. 
A. Federalization? 
The favorite remedy of reformers for the past seventy years has 
been a federal corporation code.383 There can be little doubt that this 
is a necessary step in any fundamental simplification of the corpora-
tion regime. But the job is an incredibly complex one. If the process 
of incorporation were summarily removed from the jurisdiction of 
the states, an important source of revenue and means of employ-
ment would be subtracted from the statehouses; some compensatory 
arrangement would have to be worked out. In any realistic view, the 
federal regime would be limited to some classification of large inter-
state corporations, perhaps those now registered under section 12 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.384 
Moreover, the simplification would be somewhat illusory unless 
those securities law sections that govern corporation practice were 
integrated with the corporation codes. This would mean breaking 
up the Securities Exchange Act to separate the parts regulating 
corporate conduct from those that regulate brokers, dealers, ex-
changes, and the Commission itself. And there would be no simpli-
fication at all if the SEC proceeded to issue obscure releases and 
unintelligible regulations over the whole area of corporation law. 
The most likely line of progress seems to lie through the path, 
recently opened by the American Law Institute, which involves 
combining and recodifying the Securities Act of 1933 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.385 This effort will probably involve 
stating in plain English some of the rules that the Commission has 
had to conjure up out of implication and threats. 
By the time the recodification is completed, or soon after, there 
will probably be further extensions of the federal securities legis-
lation into matters of corporate governance. The board of directors 
is due for some remolding by way of greater assurances of indepen-
dence, representation of laborers and consumers, restrictions on 
383. For an early advocacy, see address of Judge Peter Grosscup to the Ohio State 
Bar Association in July 1905, The Corporation Problem and the Lawyer's Part in Its 
Solution, 39 AM. L. REv. 835, 849-51 (1905). For more recent proposals, see Schwartz, 
Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972). The 
national Democratic Party platform for 1972 called for federal action to "establish 
a temporary national economic commission to study federal chartering of large multi-
national and international corporations, concentrated ownership and control in the 
nation's economy." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1728 (1972). 
384. 15 u.s.c. § 781 (1970). 
385. See note 276 supra and accompanying text. 
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indemnification and insurance, and limitations of individual liability, 
or some combination of these.386 
After federal penetration of corporate governance has proceeded 
so far and the SEC has demonstrated a new talent for lucidity, there 
will no longer be any reason for the business community to resist 
federalization of the laws of large corporations. In fact, the business 
community may come to welcome federalization if it frees them 
from some of the burdens of gaining admittance to each of the 
fifty states in which its salesmen set foot, or to which its goods are 
shipped. 
If a federal corporation code is adopted, it should not only 
incorporate the applicable provisions of securities laws, but also 
the appropriate provisions of antitrust law relative to trusts, stock-
holdings, and mergers, and some of the details of tax law relative to 
voting on executive compensation and the use of voting stock 
in mergers. It should surely codify the principles of fiduciary duty, 
which courts generally avow and which state codes so often pretermit. 
It could easily embody a streamlined version of the law of securities 
transfer. 
B. Uniformity? 
An alternative escape from the swamp of laws of corporations 
might lie through uniformity of state laws. An intriguing model 
for this solution is supplied by the experience of the European 
Economic Community, where countries with far greater cultural 
differences have launched on a program of "equivalent safeguards" 
for corporate investors and creditors in all corners of the Com-
munity. 387 
The basis for this movement is found in a chapter of the Treaty 
of Rome (the Communities' equivalent of a constitution) which 
enunciates the freedom of citizens of any Communities state to 
travel, reside, and do business in any other state.388 This freedom, 
known in treaty parlance as the "right of establishment," is similar 
to that conferred by the privileges and immunities clause of the 
United States Constitution, except that, unlike the latter, it includes 
386. See generally Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LA.w. 9 (1972); 
Symposium, Officers• and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW., Feb. 
1972 (special issue), at I, esp. 165-78. 
387. For a general view, see E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LA.ws 
5-22 (1971 ). 
388. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957. arts. 
52-58, 298 U.N.T.S. 37. 
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corporations within its cloak of protection.389 With respect to cor-
porations, the Treaty authorizes the Communities' government to 
make the safeguards equivalent in all the member states by co-
ordinating the safeguards required of companies for the benefit of 
investors and creditors.390 
The government of the Communities has proceeded by a unique 
legal device, the "directive." This is an order to the various member 
states to alter their national legislation to meet standards established 
by the Communities.391 The directives are binding on the member 
states, but the practice to date has not required active enforcement. 
Each directive has been first proposed by the Commission to the 
Council; it has then lain dormant for several years, awaiting Council 
action. During this period, the member states amend their laws 
in appropriate ways, so that when the Council makes the directive 
effective, each state will already be in compliance. So far, only one 
directive on company law has reached the effective stage. 
Starting with very minimal safeguards, the successive directives 
have now broadened out to cover virtually all the key points of 
company law. The first sought only to facilitate the enforcement of 
corporate contracts by regulating the public filing of documents re-
garding corporations and their officers, defining the authority of 
officers, and limiting the defense of ultra vires.392 The second direc-
tive went further, imposing requirements to ensure the contri-
bution of capital and to prevent its dissipation.393 The third out-
lined procedures for corporate fusions, whether accomplished by 
corporate resolution or by purchase of assets.894 The fourth pre-
scribed the contents of financial statements and defined the obli-
gations of companies to prepare and publish them.395 
The fifth directive goes much further, and proposes a system of 
internal organization, which must be adopted (when the directive 
takes effect) by negotiable share companies in all of the member 
389. Compare Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 
1957, art. 58, 298 U.N.T.S. 40, with Blake v. McCiung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). 
390. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 
art. 54(3)(g), 298 U.N.T .S. 38. 
391. See E. STEIN, supra note 387, at 6-9. 
392. First Council Directive of March 9, 1968, 11 E.E.C. J.O. L65/8 (1968). 
393. Proposal for a Second Council Directive, March 9, 1970, 13 E.E.C. J.O. C48/8 
(1970). 
394. Proposal for a Third Council Directive, June 16, 1970, 13 E.E.C. J.O. C89/20 
(1970). 
395. Proposal for a Fourth Council Directive, Nov. 10, 1971, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C7 /11 
(1972). 
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states.396 It requires every such company to have a two-tiered govern-
ment, divided between management and supervision, in accordance 
with the system prevailing for many decades in Germany. One third 
of the supervisory council must be chosen or approved by the em-
ployees. Derivative suits by five per cent shareholders are expressly 
authorized. There are proxy rules, and rules for shareholders' meet-
ings, and a rule that votes of "interested" shareholders cannot be 
counted in a shareholders' meeting. Independent auditors are re-
quired, with rules about their selection and their liability. 
Contemplation of the European model for achieving uniformity 
of state laws can lead only to the conclusion that it will never work 
in the United States. It is unimaginable that the state legislatures 
would accept direction from Congress, and the Constitution clearly 
contemplates that where Congress has power it should legislate 
directly. The European model is significant for Americans chiefly 
in demonstrating the importance that the most advanced foreign 
countries ascribe to "equivalence" in an economic union, and the 
wide area in which they deem equivalence to be desirable. 
The closest United States parallel to the Communities' drive for 
"equivalance" is the movement for uniformity in state laws. This 
movement has been brilliantly successful in areas of commercial 
transactions, but has been flatly rejected, notwithstanding decades 
of effort, in the matter of corporation laws397 and securities law.398 
Delaware and California will never agree. American experience 
makes it clear that uniformity is not the road to simplification of 
the laws of corporations in the United States. The persistent attempts 
to unify in the United States, and the effective drive to do so in 
Europe, confirm the need of an eventual move in that direction. 
But the means will have to be through federal legislation. To bring 
about a true simplification through that route will require passing 
through several difficult stages. 
396. Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive, Oct. 19, 1972, 15 E.E.C. J.O. Cl31/149 
(1972). 
397. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra. 
398. The Uniform Securities Act has been adopted with variations in 25 states plus 
the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 7 UNIFORM LAws 
ANN. 691 (West 1970). On differing state attitudes toward securities legislation, see 
L. Loss &: E. CowEIT, supra note 94. 
